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3.1 Global Capital Markets: Overview and Origins
At the turn of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the merits of international ﬁnan-
cial integration are under more forceful attack than at any time since the
1940s. Even mainstream academic proponents of free multilateral com-
modity trade, such as Bhagwati, argue that the risks of global ﬁnancial in-
tegration outweigh the beneﬁts it aﬀords. Critics from the left such as
Eatwell, more skeptical even of the case for free trade on current account,
suggest that since the 1960s “free international capital ﬂows” have been “as-
sociated with a deterioration in economic eﬃciency (as measured by growth
and unemployment)” (Eatwell 1997, 2).1
The resurgence of concerns over international ﬁnancial integration is un-
derstandable in light of the ﬁnancial crises in Latin America in 1994–95,
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free trade in tangible goods have long recognized that its net beneﬁts to
countries typically are distributed unevenly, creating domestic winners and
losers. But recent international ﬁnancial crises have submerged entire
economies and threatened their trading partners, inﬂicting losses all
around. International ﬁnancial transactions rely intrinsically on the expec-
tation that counterparties will fulﬁll future contractual commitments; they
therefore place conﬁdence and possibly volatile expectations at center
stage.2 These same factors are present in purely domestic ﬁnancial trades,
of course; but oversight, adjudication, and enforcement all are orders of
magnitude more diﬃcult among sovereign nations with distinct national
currencies than within a single national jurisdiction. Moreover, there is no
natural world lender of last resort, so international crises are intrinsically
harder to head oﬀ and contain. Factors other than the threat of crises, such
as the power of capital markets to constrain domestically oriented eco-
nomic policies, also have sparked concerns over greater ﬁnancial openness.
The ebb and ﬂow of international capital since the nineteenth century il-
lustrates recurring diﬃculties, as well as the alternative perspectives from
which policymakers have tried to confront them. The subsequent sections
of this paper are devoted to documenting these vicissitudes quantitatively
and explaining them. Economic theory and economic history together can
provide useful insights into events of the past and deliver relevant lessons
for today. We argue that theories of how international capital mobility has
evolved must be understood within the framework of the basic policy
trilemma constraining an open economy’s choice of monetary regime.
3.1.1 The Emergence of World Capital Markets
Prior to the nineteenth century, the geographical scope for international
ﬁnance was relatively limited compared to what was to come. Italian banks
of the Renaissance ﬁnanced trade and government around the Mediter-
ranean, and as trade expanded within Europe, ﬁnancial innovations spread
farther north through the letters of credit developed at the Champagne
Fairs and the new banks in North Sea ports such as Bruges and Antwerp.
Later, London and Amsterdam became the key centers, and their curren-
cies and ﬁnancial instruments were the principal focus of market players. As
the industrial revolution gathered force and radiated out from Great
Britain, the importance of international ﬁnancial markets became more ap-
parent in both the public and private spheres.3
In due course, the scope for such trades extended to other centers that de-
veloped the markets and institutions capable of supporting international ﬁ-
nancial transactions, and whose governments were not hostile to such de-
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2. The vast majority of commodity trades also involve an element of intertemporal ex-
change, via deferred or advance payment for goods, but the unwinding of the resulting cross-
border obligations tends to be predictable.
3. See Cameron (1993); Neal (1990, 2000); Oppers (1993); Brezis (1995).velopments. In the eastern United States, a broad range of centers includ-
ing Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore gave way to what became the dom-
inant center of national and international ﬁnance, New York. By the late
nineteenth century, both France and Germany had developed sophisticated
and expanding international markets, well integrated into the networks of
global ﬁnance. Elsewhere in Europe and the New World similar markets be-
gan from an embryonic stage, and eventually ﬁnancial trading spread to
places as far aﬁeld as Melbourne and Buenos Aires.4
As we shall discuss later, after 1870 these developments were to progress
even further. With the world starting to converge on the gold standard as a
monetary system, and with technological developments in shipping (e.g.,
steamships’ replacing sail; the Panama Canal) and communications (the
telegraph, transoceanic cables), the ﬁrst global marketplace in capital, as
well as in goods and labor, took shape in an era of undisputed liberalism and
virtual laissez-faire.
Within ﬁnance, the technological and institutional developments were
many: the use of modern communications to transmit prices; the develop-
ment of a very broad array of private debt and equity instruments, and the
widening scope for insurance activities; the expanding role of government
bond markets internationally; and the more widespread use of forward and
futures contracts, and derivative securities. By 1900, the use of such instru-
ments permeated the major economic centers of dozens of countries
around the world, stretching from Europe, east and west, north and south,
to the Americas, Asia, and Africa. The key currencies and instruments were
known everywhere, and formed the basis for an expanding world commer-
cial network, whose rise was equally meteoric. Bills of exchange, bond ﬁ-
nance, equity issues, foreign direct investments, and many other types of
transactions were by then quite common among the core countries, and
among a growing number of nations at the periphery.
Aside from haute ﬁnance, more and more day-to-day activities came into
the orbit of ﬁnance via the growth and development of banking systems in
many countries, oﬀering checking and saving accounts as time passed. This
in turn raised the question of whether banking supervision would be done
by the banks themselves or the government authorities, with solutions in-
cluding free banking and “wildcat” banks (as in the United States), and
changing over time to include supervisory functions as part of a broader
central monetary authority, the central bank. From what was once an eso-
teric sector of the economy, the ﬁnancial sector grew locally and globally to
touch an ever-expanding range of activity.5
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4. On the United States see Davis (1965) and Sylla (1975, 1998). On Europe see Kindleberger
(1984). For a comprehensive discussion of the historical and institutional developments in
some key countries where international ﬁnancial markets made an impact at this time—the
United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Argentina, and Canada—see Davis and Gall-
man (2001). On comparative ﬁnancial deepening and sophistication see Goldsmith (1985).
5. On ﬁnancial development, see chapter 8, by Rousseau and Sylla, in this volume.Thus, the scope for capital markets to do good—or do harm—loomed
larger as time went by. As an ever-greater part of national and international
economies became monetized and sensitive to ﬁnancial markets, agents in
all spheres—public and private, labor and capital, domestic and foreign—
were aﬀected. Who stood to gain or lose? What policies would emerge as
government objectives evolved? Would global capital markets proceed un-
fettered or not? From the turn of the twentieth century, the unfolding his-
tory of the international capital market has been of enormous import. At
various times the market has shaped the course of national and interna-
tional economic development and swayed political interests in all manner
of directions. In terms of distribution and equality, it has made winners and
losers, although so often is the process misunderstood that the winners and
losers are often unclear, at the national and the global level. An aim of this
paper is to tell the history of what became a truly global capital market on
the eve of the twentieth century, and explore how it has inﬂuenced the
course of events ever since.
3.1.2 Stylized Facts for the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
Notwithstanding the undisputed record of technological advancement
and economic growth over the long run, we must reject the temptations of
a simple linear history as we examine international capital markets and
their evolution. It has not been a record of ever-more-perfectly functioning
markets with ever-lower transaction costs and ever-expanding scope. The
mid-twentieth century, on the contrary, was marked by an enormous reac-
tion against markets, international as well as domestic, and against ﬁnan-
cial markets in particular.6 Muted echoes of these same themes could be
heard once again at the end of the twentieth century.
What do we already know about the evolution of global capital mobility
in the last century or more? Very few previous studies exist for the entire pe-
riod and covering a suﬃciently comprehensive cross-section of countries;
but many authors have focused on individual countries and particular
epochs, and from their work we can piece together a working set of hy-
potheses that might be termed the conventional wisdom concerning the
evolution of international capital mobility in the post-1870 era. The story
comes in four parts, and not coincidentally these echo the division of the
twentieth century into distinct international monetary regimes.7
The ﬁrst period runs up to 1914. After 1870 an increasing share of the
world economy came into the orbit of the classical gold standard, and a
global capital market centered on London. By 1880, quite a few countries
were on gold, and by 1900 a large number. This ﬁxed exchange rate system
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6. See Polanyi (1944).
7. On this division of history see, in particular, Eichengreen (1996). Earlier surveys of the
progress of ﬁnancial market globalization since the nineteenth century include Obstfeld and
Taylor (1998), Bordo, Eichengreen, and Kim (1999), and Flandreau and Rivière (1999).was for most countries a stable and credible regime, and functioned as a dis-
ciplining or commitment device. Accordingly, interest rates across coun-
tries tended to converge, and capital ﬂows surged. Many peripheral coun-
tries, not to mention the New World oﬀshoots of western Europe, took part
in an increasingly globalized economy in not only the capital market, but
also the goods and labor markets.8
In the second period, from 1914 to 1945, this global economy was de-
stroyed. Two world wars and a Great Depression accompanied a rise in na-
tionalism and increasingly noncooperative economic policymaking. With
gold-standard credibility broken by World War I, monetary policy became
subject to domestic political goals, ﬁrst as a way to help ﬁnance wartime
deﬁcits. Later, monetary policy was a tool to engineer beggar-thy-neighbor
devaluations under ﬂoating rates. As a guard against currency crises and to
protect gold, capital controls became widespread. The world economy went
from globalized to almost autarkic in the space of a few decades. Capital
ﬂows were minimal, international investment was regarded with suspicion,
and international prices and interest rates fell completely out of synchro-
nization. Global capital (along with ﬁnance in general) was demonized, and
seen as a principal cause of the world depression of the 1930s.9
In the third period, the Bretton Woods era (1945–71), an attempt to re-
build the global economy took shape. Trade ﬂows began a remarkable ex-
pansion, and economic growth began its most rapid spurt in history world-
wide. Yet fears formed in the interwar period concerning global capital
were not easily dispelled. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) initially
sanctioned capital controls as a means to prevent currency crises and runs,
and this lent some autonomy to governments by providing more power to
activist monetary policy. For twenty years, this prevailing philosophy held
ﬁrm; and although capital markets recovered, they did so slowly. But by the
late 1960s global capital could not be held back so easily, and its workings
eventually broke the compromise that had sustained the ﬁxed exchange rate
system.10
In the fourth and ﬁnal period, the post–Bretton Woods ﬂoating-rate era,
a diﬀerent trend has been evident. Although ﬁxed-rate regimes were reluc-
tantly given up, and although some countries still attempt to maintain or
create such regimes anew, the years from the 1970s to the 1990s have been
characterized by a seeming increase in capital mobility. Generally speaking,
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8. On the gold standard regime and late-nineteenth-century capital markets see, inter alia,
Eichengreen (1996); Eichengreen and Flandreau (1996); Bordo and Kydland (1995); Bordo
and Rockoﬀ(1996); Edelstein (1982). On this ﬁrst era of globalization in goods and factor mar-
kets see Sachs and Warner (1995); Williamson (1996); O’Rourke and Williamson (1999); and
chapters 1 (by Findlay and O’Rourke) and 2 (by Chiswick and Hatton) in this volume.
9. See Eichengreen (1992, 1996) and Temin (1989). In labor markets migrations collapsed
and in goods markets trade barriers multiplied (Kindleberger 1986, 1989; Williamson 1995;
James 2001).
10. On Bretton Woods see, for example, Bordo and Eichengreen (1993); Eichengreen (1996).industrial-country governments no longer needed capital controls as a tool
to help preserve a ﬁxed exchange rate peg, since the peg was gone. As a
ﬂoating rate could accommodate market developments, controls could be
lifted. This was encouraging to the ﬂow of capital in all countries. In pe-
ripheral countries, economic reforms reduced the transactions costs and
risks of foreign investment, and capital ﬂows grew there, too—at least un-
til the crises of the later 1990s reminded investors of the fragility of the ﬁxed-
rate regimes that tended to persist in the developing world. Increasingly, the
smaller peripheral countries that desire ﬁxed exchange rates seek credibly to
give up domestic monetary policy autonomy through currency boards or
even dollarization, whereas larger developing countries such as Mexico,
Chile, and Brazil have opted for exchange rate ﬂexibility coupled with in-
ﬂation targeting.
In the 1990s, the term globalizationhas became a catch-all to describe the
phenomenon of an increasingly integrated and interdependent world econ-
omy, one that exhibits supposedly free ﬂows of goods, services, and capital,
albeit not of labor. Yet for all the hype, economic history suggests we be a
little cautious in assessing how amazing this development really is. We will
show that a period of impressive global integration has been witnessed be-
fore, at least for capital markets—at the turn of the twentieth century, just
about a hundred years ago. Of course, that earlier epoch of globalization
did not endure. As the above discussion suggests, if we were roughly to
sketch out the implied movements in capital mobility, we would chart an
upswing from 1880 to 1914; this would be followed by a collapse to 1945, al-
though perhaps with a minor recovery during the brief reconstruction of
the gold standard in the 1920s, between the autarky of World War I and the
Depression; we would then think of a gradual rise in mobility after 1945, be-
coming faster after the demise of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s.
For illustrative purposes, let us make the tenuous assumption that inter-
national capital mobility or global capital market integration couldbe mea-
sured on a single parameter. Suppose we could plot that parameter over
time for the last century or so. We would then expect to see a time path
something like ﬁgure 3.1, where the vertical axis carries the mobility or in-
tegration measure. It is reasonable, given the speciﬁc histories of various
subperiods or certain countries, as contained in numerous fragments of the
historical literature, to speak of capital mobility increasing or decreasing at
the times we have noted. Thus, the overall U-shaped trend line indicated by
the ﬁgure is probably correct.
However, without further quantiﬁcation the usefulness of the stylized
view remains unclear. For one thing, we do not know if it accords with em-
pirical measures of capital mobility. Moreover, even if we know the direc-
tion of changes in the mobility of capital at various times, we cannot mea-
sure the extent of those changes. Without such evidence, we cannot assess
whether the U-shaped trend path is complete: That is, have we now reached
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before 1914? To address these questions requires more formal empirical
testing, and that is one of the motivations for the quantitative analysis that
follows.
3.1.3 The Trilemma: Capital Mobility, the
Exchange Rate, and Monetary Policy
We seek in this paper not only to oﬀer evidence in support of the stylized
view of global capital market evolution, but also to provide an organizing
framework for understanding that evolution and the forces that shaped the
international economy of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Given
the stylized description, we must address the following question: What ex-
plains the long stretch of high capital mobility that prevailed before 1914,
the subsequent breakdown in the interwar period, and the very slow post-
war reconstruction of the world ﬁnancial system? The answer is tied up with
one of the central and most visible areas in which openness to the world
capital market constrains government power: the choice of an exchange rate
regime.11
The macroeconomic policy trilemma for open economies (also known as
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Fig. 3.1 Conjecture? A stylized view of capital mobility in modern history
Source: Introspection.
11. This section draws on Obstfeld and Taylor (1998), who invoked the term “trilemma,” and
Obstfeld (1998).the inconsistent trinity proposition) follows from a basic fact: An open cap-
ital market deprives a country’s government of the ability simultaneously to
target its exchange rate and to use monetary policy in pursuit of other eco-
nomic objectives. The trilemma arises because a macroeconomic policy
regime can include, at most, two elements of the inconsistent trinity of three
policy goals:
1. full freedom of cross-border capital movements
2. a ﬁxed exchange rate
3. an independent monetary policy oriented toward domestic objectives
If capital movements are prohibited, in the case where element (1) is ruled
out, a country on a ﬁxed exchange rate can break ranks with foreign interest
rates and thereby run an independent monetary policy. Similarly, a ﬂoating
exchange rate, in the case where element (2) is ruled out, reconciles freedom
of international capital movements with monetary-policy eﬀectiveness (at
least when some nominal domestic prices are sticky). But monetary policy
is powerless to achieve domestic goals when the exchange rate is ﬁxed and
capital movements free, the case where element (3) is ruled out, since inter-
vention in support of the exchange parity then entails capital ﬂows that ex-
actly oﬀset any monetary-policy action threatening to alter domestic inter-
est rates.12
Our central proposition is that secular movements in the scope of inter-
national lending and borrowing may be understood in terms of this
trilemma. Capital mobility has prevailed and expanded under circum-
stances of widespread political support either for an exchange-rate-
subordinated monetary regime (e.g., the gold standard), or for a monetary
regime geared mainly toward domestic objectives at the expense of ex-
change rate stability (e.g., the recent ﬂoat). The middle ground in which
countries attempt simultaneously to hit exchange rate targets and domestic
policy goals has, almost as a logical consequence, entailed exchange con-
trols or other harsh constraints on international transactions.
It is this conﬂict among rival policy choices, the trilemma, that informs
our discussion of the historical evolution of world capital markets in the
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12. The choice between ﬁxed and ﬂoating exchange rates should not be viewed as dichoto-
mous; nor should it be assumed that the choice of a ﬂoating-rate regime necessarily leads to a
useful degree of monetary policy ﬂexibility. In reality, the degree of exchange rate ﬂexibility lies
on a continuum, with exchange rate target zones, crawling pegs, crawling zones, and managed
ﬂoats of various other kinds residing between the extremes of irrevocably ﬁxed and freely ﬂoat-
ing. The greater the attention given to the exchange rate, the more constrained monetary pol-
icy is in pursuing other objectives. Indeed, the notion of a “free” ﬂoat is an abstraction with
little empirical content, as few governments are willing to set monetary policy without some
consideration of its exchange rate eﬀects. Even under a free ﬂoat, autonomy could be com-
promised. If ﬂoating exchange rates are subject to persistent speculative shocks unrelated to
economic fundamentals, and if policymakers are concerned to counter these movements, then
monetary control will be compromised.pages that follow, and helps make sense of the ebb and ﬂow of capital mo-
bility in the long run and in the broader political-economy context.
Of course, the trilemma is only a proximate explanation, in the sense that
deeper sociopolitical forces explain the relative dominance of some policy
targets over others. Cohen (1996, 274–75) usefully distinguishes four po-
tential categories of explanation concerning the evolution of international
ﬁnancial integration. We paraphrase his categories by distinguishing expla-
nations based upon
1. technological innovation, including resulting increases in market
competition;
2. policy competition among governments seeking to advance “state in-
terest,” somehow deﬁned;
3. domestic politics, including partisan rivalry and interest-group lobby-
ing;
4. ideology and advances in economic knowledge.
We view explanations based on technology as secondary for the period of
interest to us (starting in the latter part of the nineteenth century), as it fol-
lows the deployment of transoceanic cable technology.13 The precise deﬁni-
tion of state interest may well reﬂect the domestic political power structure,
so explanations of classes (2) and (3) need not be disjoint. Yet there may be
situations in which there is a broad domestic consensus regarding certain
policies as in the national interest. Similarly, ideology and the state of
knowledge can determine the policies that states pursue in seeking a given
perceived national interest. As will become clear in what follows, we regard
explanations along the lines of (2) and especially (3) as the “deep factors”
behind movements in international ﬁnancial integration, with a supporting
role for (4) as well.14 The central role of the trilemma is to constrain the
choice set within which the deep factors play their roles.
3.1.4 A Brief Narrative
The broad trends and cycles in the world capital market that we will doc-
ument reﬂect changing responses to the fundamental trilemma. Before
1914, each of the world’s major economies pegged its currency’s price in
terms of gold, and thus, implicitly, maintained a ﬁxed rate of exchange
against every other major country’s currency. Financial interests ruled the
world of the classical gold standard and ﬁnancial orthodoxy saw no alter-
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13. We recognize, however, that technology- or policy-driven changes in the extent of goods-
market integration might aﬀect some measures of ﬁnancial integration, as in the analysis of
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000).
14. Rajan and Zingales (2001) place interest-group politics at center stage in their theory of
domestic ﬁnancial market liberalization. They ﬁnd a U-shaped evolution of domestic ﬁnancial
evolution reminiscent of the pattern for international integration that we document in this pa-
per. While they seem to view international capital mobility as basically exogenous to the process
of domestic liberalization, we would view the two as jointly determined by the deeper factors.native mode of sound ﬁnance.15 Thus, the gold standard system met the
trilemma by opting for ﬁxed exchange rates and capital mobility, sometimes
at the expense of domestic macroeconomic health. Between 1891 and 1897,
for example, the U.S. Treasury put the country through a harsh deﬂation in
the face of persistent speculation on the dollar’s departure from gold. These
policies were hotly debated; the Populist movement agitated forcefully
against gold, but lost.16
The balance of political power began to shift only with the First World
War, which brought a sea change in the social contract underlying the indus-
trial democracies. For a sample of industrial countries, ﬁgure 3.2 shows the
Polity IV coding for “institutional democracy” as it evolved over the period
bracketing the First World War (the coding ranges from 0 to 11; see Marshall
and Jaggers n.d. for details). Other than for the United States (which has a
constant score of 10 throughout the sample period, and is omitted from the
ﬁgure) there is clear evidence of a discrete increase in political openness in
the decade or so after 1918.17 Organized labor emerged as a political power,
a counterweight to the interests of capital, as seen in the British labor unrest
of the 1920s, which culminated in a general strike. Great Britain’s return to
gold in 1925 led the way to a restored international gold standard and a lim-
ited resurgence of international ﬁnance, but weaknesses in the rebuilt system
helped propagate a global depression after the 1929 U.S. downturn.
Following (and in some cases anticipating) Great Britain’s example,
many countries abandoned the gold standard in the early 1930s and depre-
ciated their currencies; many also resorted to trade and capital controls in
order to manage independently their exchange rates and domestic policies.
Those countries in the “gold bloc,” which stubbornly clung to gold through
the mid-1930s, showed the steepest output and price-level declines. James’s
(2001, 189–97) account of French policymakers’ vacillation between con-
trols and devaluation well illustrates the interaction between political pres-
sures and the trilemma. Eventually, in the 1930s, all countries jettisoned
rigid exchange rate targets and open capital markets in favor of domestic
macroeconomic goals.18
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15. See Bordo and Schwartz (1984); Eichengreen (1996).
16. Frieden’s (1997) econometric evidence shows how ﬁnancial interests promoted U.S. ad-
herence to gold, whereas those who would have gained from currency depreciation favored sil-
ver. A similar debate over the monetary regime arose in Germany, where Prussian agriculture
estate owners lobbied for relaxing the restraints of the gold standard (but were much more suc-
cessful at getting tariﬀ protection). See Gerschenkron (1943, 57n. 62).
17. The variable is composed of separate codings for the “competitiveness of political par-
ticipation,” the “openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment,” and “constraints on
the chief executive.” We do not plot the variable during periods of political interruption or
transition. These data are comparable to the Polity III source used to construct the index of
global democratization presented by Niall Ferguson in the panel discussion that concludes this
volume.
18. See Eichengreen and Sachs (1985); Temin (1989); Eichengreen (1992); Bernanke and
Carey (1996); Obstfeld and Taylor (1998).These decisions reﬂected the shift in political power solidiﬁed by the First
World War. They also signaled the beginnings of a new consensus on the
role of economic policy that would endure through the inﬂationary 1970s.
As an immediate consequence, however, the Great Depression discredited
gold-standard orthodoxy and brought Keynesian ideas about macroeco-
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Fig. 3.2 Institutional democracy, Polity IV scores
Source: Marshall and Jaggers (n.d.).nomic management to the fore. It also made ﬁnancial markets and ﬁnancial
practitioners unpopular. Their supposed excesses and attachment to gold
became identiﬁed in the public mind as causes of the economic calamity. In
the United States, the New Deal brought a Jacksonian hostility toward east-
ern (read: New York) high ﬁnance back to Washington. Financial markets
were more closely regulated, and the Federal Reserve was brought under
heavier Treasury inﬂuence. Similar reactions occurred in other countries.
Changed attitudes toward ﬁnancial activities and economic management
underlay the new postwar economic order negotiated at Bretton Woods,
New Hampshire, in July 1944. Forty-four allied countries set up a system
based on ﬁxed, but adjustable, exchange parities, in the belief that ﬂoating
exchange rates would exhibit instability and damage international trade. At
the center of the system was the IMF. The IMF’s prime function was as a
source of hard-currency loans to governments that might otherwise have to
put their economies temporarily into recession to maintain a ﬁxed ex-
change rate. Countries experiencing permanent balance-of-payments
problems had the option of realigning their currencies, subject to IMF ap-
proval.19
Importantly, the IMF’s founders viewed its lending capability as prima-
rily a substitute for, not a complement to, private capital inﬂows. Interwar
experience had given the latter a reputation as unreliable at best and, at
worst, as a dangerous source of disturbances. Broad, encompassing con-
trols over private capital movement, perfected in wartime, were expected to
continue. The IMF’s Articles of Agreement explicitly empowered countries
to impose new capital controls. Articles VIII and XIV of the IMF agree-
ment did demand that countries’ currencies eventually be made convert-
ible—in eﬀect, freely saleable to the issuing central bank, at the oﬃcial ex-
change parity, for dollars or gold. But this privilege was to be extended only
if the country’s currency had been earned through current account transac-
tions. Convertibility on capital account, as opposed to current-account
convertibility, was not viewed as mandatory or desirable.
Unfortunately, a wide extent even of current-account convertibility took
many years to achieve, and even then it was often restricted to nonresidents.
In the interim, countries resorted to bilateral trade deals that required bal-
anced or nearly balanced trade between every pair of trading partners. If
France had an export surplus with Great Britain, and Great Britain a sur-
plus with Germany, then Great Britain could not use its excess deutsche
marks to obtain dollars with which to pay France. Germany had very few
dollars and guarded them jealously for critical imports from the Americas.
Instead, each country would try to divert import demand toward countries
with high demand for its goods, and to direct its exports toward countries
whose goods were favored domestically.
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19. On the Bretton Woods system, see Bordo and Eichengreen (1993).Convertibility gridlock in Europe and its dependencies was ended
through a regional multilateral clearing scheme, the European Payments
Union (EPU). The clearing scheme was set up in 1950 and some countries
reached de facto convertibility by mid-decade. But it was not until 27 De-
cember 1958 that Europe oﬃcially embraced convertibility and ended the
EPU. Although most European countries still chose to retain extensive cap-
ital controls (Germany being the main exception), the return to convertibil-
ity, important as it was in promoting multilateral trade growth, also in-
creased the opportunities for disguised capital movements. These might
take the form, for example, of misinvoicing, or of accelerated or delayed
merchandise payments. Buoyant growth encouraged some countries in fur-
ther ﬁnancial liberalization, although the United States, worried about its
gold losses, raised progressively higher barriers to capital outﬂow over the
1960s. Eventually, the Bretton Woods system’s very successes hastened its
collapse by resurrecting the trilemma.20
Key countries in the system, notably the United States (fearful of slower
growth) and Germany (fearful of higher inﬂation), proved unwilling to ac-
cept the domestic policy implications of maintaining ﬁxed rates. Even the
limited capital mobility of the early 1970s proved suﬃcient to allow furious
speculative attacks on the major currencies, and after vain attempts to re-
store ﬁxed dollar exchange rates, the industrial countries retreated to ﬂoat-
ing rates early in 1973. Although viewed at the time as a temporary emer-
gency measure, the ﬂoating-dollar-rate regime is still with us thirty years
later.
Floating exchange rates have allowed the explosion in international ﬁ-
nancial markets experienced over the same three decades. Freed from one
element of the trilemma—ﬁxed exchange rates—countries have been able
to open their capital markets while still retaining the ﬂexibility to deploy
monetary policy in pursuit of national objectives. No doubt the experience
gained after the inﬂationary 1970s in anchoring monetary policy to avoid
price instability has helped to promote ongoing ﬁnancial integration. Per-
haps for the ﬁrst time in history, countries have learned how to keep inﬂa-
tion in check under ﬁat monies and ﬂoating exchange rates.
There are several potentially valid reasons, however, for countries to still
ﬁx their exchange rates—for example, to keep a better lid on inﬂation or to
counter exchange-rate instability due to ﬁnancial market shocks. Such ar-
guments may ﬁnd particular resonance, of course, in developing countries.
However, few countries that have tried to ﬁx have succeeded for long; even-
tually, exchange rate stability tends to come into conﬂict with other policy
objectives, the capital markets catch on to the government’s predicament,
and a crisis adds enough economic pain to make the authorities give in. In
recent years only a very few major countries have observed the discipline of
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20. See Triﬃn (1957); Einzig (1968); Bordo and Eichengreen (2001).ﬁxed exchange rates for at least ﬁve years, and most of those were rather spe-
cial cases.21
The European Union members that maintained mutually ﬁxed rates
prior to January 1999 were aided by market conﬁdence in their own planned
solution to the trilemma, a near-term currency merger. Developing coun-
tries have generally not fared so well. Even Hong Kong, which operates a
currency board supposedly subordinated to maintaining the Hong Kong–
U.S. dollar peg, suﬀered repeated speculative attacks in the Asian crisis pe-
riod. Another currency-board experiment, Argentina, held to its 1:1 dollar
exchange rate from April 1991 for a remarkable stint of more than ten years.
To accomplish that feat, the country relied on IMF and private credit and,
despite episodes of growth, endured levels of unemployment higher than
many countries could tolerate. It suﬀered especially acutely after Brazil
moved to a ﬂoat in January 1999. Three years later Argentina’s political and
economic arrangements disintegrated in the face of external default (De-
cember 2001) and currency collapse (January–February 2002).
For most larger countries, the trend toward greater ﬁnancial openness
has been accompanied—inevitably, we would argue—by a declining re-
liance on pegged exchange rates in favor of greater exchange rate ﬂexibility.
Some countries have opted for a diﬀerent solution, however, adopting ex-
treme straitjackets for monetary policy in order to peg an exchange rate. If
monetary policy is geared toward domestic considerations, capital mobility
or the exchange rate target must go. If, instead, ﬁxed exchange rates and in-
tegration into the global capital market are the primary desiderata, mone-
tary policy must be subjugated to those ends.
The details of this argument require a book-length discourse (Obstfeld
and Taylor 2003), which allows a full survey of the empirical evidence and
the historical record, but we can already pinpoint the key turning points
(see table 3.1). The Great Depression stands as the watershed here, in that
it was caused by an ill-advised subordination of monetary policy to an ex-
change rate constraint (the gold standard), which led to a chaotic time of
troubles in which countries experimented, typically noncooperatively, with
alternative modes of addressing the fundamental trilemma. Interwar expe-
rience, in turn, discredited the gold standard and led to a new and fairly uni-
versal policy consensus. The new consensus shaped the more cooperative
postwar international economic order fashioned by Harry Dexter White
and John Maynard Keynes, but implanted within that order the seeds of its
own eventual destruction a quarter-century later. The global ﬁnancial
nexus that has evolved since then rests on a solution to the basic open-
economy trilemma quite diﬀerent than that envisioned by Keynes or
White—one that allows considerable freedom for capital movements and
gives the major currency areas freedom to pursue internal goals, but largely
leaves their mutual exchange rates as the equilibrating residual.
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21. See Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995).3.1.5 Summary
As always, we have to consider the potential costs and beneﬁts of inter-
national capital mobility for the national participants. Clearly, the ability to
lend or borrow represents, trivially, a loosening of constraints relative to a
perfectly closed economy. In this dimension, at least, open trade in ﬁnan-
cial markets oﬀers unambiguous gains relative to a closed economy. Such
trades permit insurance and the smoothing of shocks, and allow capital to
seek out its highest rewards, implying the usual gains-from-trade results.
However, in other ways, international ﬁnancial mobility raises concerns,
particularly for policymakers attached to certain policy goals that may be
inconsistent with the free ﬂow of capital across international boundaries. In
addition, the risks of ﬁnancial and balance-of-payments crises—some of
them self-fulﬁlling crises unrelated to “fundamentals”—may represent fur-
ther obstacles to the adoption of free capital markets.
Although these are very much contemporary issues in world capital mar-
kets, the questions they raise can be traced back to the very founding of in-
ternational ﬁnancial markets centuries ago during the Renaissance. Then,
too, advanced forms of ﬁnancial asset trades developed very quickly, some-
times as a response to Church-imposed constraints such as usury proscrip-
tions. Financial innovation was subject to suspicion from various quarters,
both public and private. Thus, calls for the regulation and restriction of ﬁ-
nancial market activity have been with us since the earliest days.
Despite these fears, by the late nineteenth century a succession of tech-
nological breakthroughs, and a gradual institutional evolution, had posi-
tioned many nations in a newly forming international capital market. This
network of nations embraced modern ﬁnancial instruments and operated
virtually free of controls on the part of governments. Under the gold stan-
dard monetary regime, this ﬂourishing global market for capital reached at
least a local peak in the decades just prior to World War I.
The subsequent history of the twentieth century showed that this seem-
ingly linear path toward ever more technological progress and institutional
sophistication in a liberal world order could indeed be upset. Two global
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Table 3.1 The Trilemma and Major Phases of Capital Mobility
Sacriﬁces Countries Choose to
Resolve Trilemma
Activist Capital Fixed 
Era Policies Mobility Exchange Rate Notes
Gold standard Most Few Few Broad consensus
Interwar Few Several Most Capital controls, especially in Central 
(when oﬀ gold)  Europe and Latin America
Bretton Woods Few Most Few Broad consensus
Float Few Few Many Some consensus, except currency 
boards, dollarization, etc.wars and a depression led the world down an autarkic path. Conﬂicting pol-
icy goals and democratic tensions often put the interests of global capital at
a low premium relative to other objectives. Activist governments appealed
to capital controls to sidestep the discipline of external markets, invoking
monetary policy as a tool of macroeconomic control.
These events demonstrate the power of the macroeconomic policy
trilemma to account for many of the ups and downs in global capital mar-
ket evolution in the twentieth century. In the next section, we match up these
stylized facts with details from the quantitative and institutional record, so
as to better document the course of events. It is a remarkable history with-
out which today’s economic, ﬁnancial, political, and institutional land-
scape cannot be fully understood.
3.2 Evidence
In theory and practice, the extent of international capital mobility can
have profound implications for the operation of individual and global
economies. With respect to theory, the applicability of various classes of
macroeconomic models rests on many assumptions, and not the least im-
portant of these are axioms linked to the closure of the model in the capital
market. The predictions of a theory and its usefulness for policy debates can
revolve critically on this part of the structure.
The importance of these issues for policy is not surprising at all, and a mo-
ment’s reﬂection on practical aspects of macroeconomic policy choice under-
scores the impact that capital mobility can have on the eﬃcacy of various in-
terventions: Trivially, if capital is perfectly mobile, this dooms to failure any
attempts to manipulate local asset prices to make them deviate from global
prices, including the most critical macroeconomic asset price, the interest rate.
Thus, the feasibility and relevance of key policy actions cannot be judged, ab-
sent some informed position on the extent to which local economic conditions
are in any way separable from global conditions. This means an empirical
measure of market integration is implicitly, although rarely explicitly, a nec-
essary adjunct to any policy discussion. Although recent globalization trends
have brought this issue to the fore, this paper shows how the experience of
longer-run macroeconomic history can clarify and inform these debates.
In attacking the problem of measuring market integration, economists
have no universally recognized criterion to turn to. For example, imagine
the simple expedient of examining price diﬀerentials: Prices would be iden-
tical in two identical neighboring economies, being determined in each by
the identical structures of tastes, technologies, and endowments; but if the
two markets were physically separated by an inﬁnitely high transaction-cost
barrier one could hardly describe them as being integrated in a single mar-
ket, as the equality of prices was merely a chance event. Or consider look-
ing at the size of ﬂows between two markets as a gauge of mobility; this is
an equally ﬂawed criterion, for suppose we now destroyed the barrier be-
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zero. We would then truly have a single integrated market, but because, on
either side of the barrier, prices were identical in autarky, there would be no
incentive for any good or factor to move after the barrier disappeared.
Thus, convergence of prices and movements of goods are not unambigu-
ous indicators of market integration. One could run through any number of
other putative criteria for market integration, examining perhaps the levels
or correlations of prices or quantities, and ﬁnd essentially the same kind of
weakness: All such tests may be able to evaluate market integration, but
only as a joint hypothesis test where some auxiliary assumptions are needed
to make the test meaningful.
Given this impasse, a historical study such as the present paper is poten-
tially valuable in two respects. First, we can use a very large array of data
sources covering diﬀerent aspects of international capital mobility over the
last 100 years or more. Without being wedded to a single criterion, we can
attempt to make inferences about the path of global capital mobility with a
battery of tests, using both quantity and price criteria of various kinds. As
long as important caveats are kept in mind about each method, especially
the auxiliary assumptions required for meaningful inference, we can essay
a broad-based approach to the evidence. Should the diﬀerent methods all
lead to a similar conclusion we would be in a stronger position than if we
simply relied on a single test.
Historical work oﬀers a second beneﬁt in that it provides a natural set of
benchmarks for our understanding of today’s situation. In addition to the
many competing tests for capital mobility, we also face the problem that al-
most every test is usually a matter of degree, of interpreting a parameter or
a measure of dispersion or some other variable or coeﬃcient. We face the
typical empirical conundrums (how big is big? or how fast is fast?) in plac-
ing an absolute meaning on these measures.
A historical perspective allows a more nuanced view, and places all such
inferences in a relative context: When we say that a parameter for capital
mobility is big, this is easier to interpret if we can say that by this we mean
bigger than a decade or a century ago. The historical focus of this paper will
be directed at addressing just such concerns.22 We examine the broadest
range of data over the last 100-plus years to see what has happened to the
degree of capital mobility in a cross-section of countries.23
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22. But note that, again, auxiliary assumptions will be necessary, and the caveats will be con-
sidered along the way; for example, what if neighboring economies became exogenously more
or less identical over time, but no more or less integrated in terms of transaction costs?
23. Given the limitations of the data, we will frequently be restricted to looking at between
a dozen and twenty countries for which long-run macroeconomic statistics are available, and
this sample will be dominated by today’s developed countries, including most of the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. However, we also
have long data series for some developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico;
and in some criteria, such as our opening look at the evolution of the stock of foreign invest-
ments, we can examine a much broader sample.The empirical work begins by looking at quantity data, focusing on
changes in the stocks of foreign capital over a century or more.24 Subse-
quent empirical sketches focus on price-based criteria for capital market in-
tegration, looking at nominal interest arbitrage, real interest rate conver-
gence, and equity returns.
3.2.1 Gross Stocks of Foreign Capital
In this section we examine the extant data on foreign capital stocks to get
some sense of the evolution of the global market. We seek some measure of
the size of foreign investment globally that is appropriately scaled and con-
sistent over time.
Although the concept is simple, the measurement is not. Perhaps the sim-
plest measure of the activity in the global capital market is obtained by
looking at the total stock of overseas investment at a point in time. Suppose
that the total asset stock in country or region i, owned by country or region
j, at time t is Aijt. Included in here is the domestically owned capital stock
Aijt. Of interest are two concepts: What assets of country j reside overseas,
and what liabilities of country i are held overseas?
A relatively easy hurdle to surmount concerns normalization of the data;
foreign investment stocks are commonly measured at a point in time in cur-
rent nominal terms, in most cases U.S. dollars. Obviously, the growth of
both the national and international economies might be associated with an
increase in such a nominal quantity, as would any long-run inﬂation. These
trends would have nothing to do with market integration per se. To over-
come this problem, we elected to normalize foreign capital at each point in
time by some measure of the size of the world economy, dividing through by
a denominator in the form of a nominal size index.
A seemingly ideal denominator, given that the numerator is the stock of
foreign-owned capital, would probably be the total stock of capital,
whether ﬁnancial or real. The problem with using ﬁnancial capital mea-
sures is that they have greatly multiplied over the long run as ﬁnancial de-
velopment has expanded the number of balance sheets in the economy,
thanks to the rise of numerous ﬁnancial intermediaries.25 This trend, in
principle, could happen at any point in time without any underlying change
in the extent of foreign asset holdings. The problem with using real capital
stocks is that data construction is fraught with diﬃculty.26
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24. Elsewhere we have examined ﬂows of foreign capital, and more reﬁned quantity criteria
using the correlations of saving and investment over the long run (Obstfeld and Taylor 1998,
2003).
25. See Goldsmith (1985).
26. Only a few countries have reliable data from which to estimate capital stocks. Most of
these estimates are accurate only at benchmark censuses, and in between census dates they rely
on combinations of interpolation and estimation based on investment-ﬂow data and depreci-
ation assumptions. Most of these estimates are calculated in real (constant price) rather than
nominal (current price) terms, which makes them incommensurate with the nominally mea-Given these problems we chose a simpler and more readily available mea-
sure of the size of an economy, namely the level of output Y measured in
current prices in a common currency unit.27Over short horizons, unless the
capital-output ratio were to move dramatically, the ratio of foreign capital
to output should be adequate as a proxy measure of the penetration of for-
eign capital in any economy. Over the long run, diﬃculties might arise if the
capital-output ratio has changed signiﬁcantly over time—but we have little
ﬁrm evidence to suggest that it has.28Thus, as a result of these long-run data
constraints, our analysis focuses on capital-to-GDP ratios of the forms
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However, even with the concept established, measurement is still prob-
lematic in the case of the numerator. It is in fact very diﬃcult to discover the
extent of foreign capital in an economy using both contemporary and his-
torical data. For example, the IMF has always reported balance-of-
payments ﬂow transactions in its International Financial Statistics. It is
straightforward for most of the recent postwar period to discover the an-
nual ﬂows of equity, debt, or other forms of capital account transactions
from these accounts. Conversely, it was only in 1997 that the IMF began re-
porting the corresponding stock data, namely, the international investment
position of each country. These data are also more sparse, beginning in 1980
for fewer than a dozen countries, and expanding to about thirty countries
by the mid-1990s.
The paucity of data is understandable, since the collection burden for
these data is much more signiﬁcant: Knowing the size of a bond issue in a
single year reveals the ﬂow transaction size; knowing the implications for
future stocks requires, for example, tracking each debt and equity item and
its ﬂuctuating market value over time, and maintaining an aggregate of
these data. The stock data are not simply a temporal aggregate of ﬂows: The
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sured foreign capital data. At the end of the day, we would be unlikely to ﬁnd more than a hand-
ful of countries for which this technique would be feasible for the entire twentieth century, and
certainly nothing like global coverage would be possible even for recent years.
27. For the GDP data we rely on Maddison’s (1995) constant price 1990 U.S. dollar estimates
of output for the period from 1820. These ﬁgures are then “reﬂated” using a U.S. price deﬂa-
tor to obtain estimates of nominal U.S. dollar “world” GDP at each benchmark date. This ap-
proach is crude, since, in particular, it relies on a purchasing power parity assumption. Ideally
we would want historical series on nominal GDP and exchange rates, to estimate a common
(U.S. dollar) GDP ﬁgure at various historical dates.
28. But for exactly the reasons just mentioned, since we have no capital stock data for many
countries, it is hard to form a sample of capital-output ratios to see how these diﬀer across time
and space. The conventional wisdom is that the capital-output ratio ranges from three to four
for most countries, although perhaps lower in capital-scarce developing countries.stock value depends on past ﬂows; capital gains and losses; any retirements
of principal or buybacks of equity; defaults and reschedulings; and a host
of other factors. Not surprisingly, accurate data of this type are hard to as-
semble.29 Just as the IMF has had diﬃculty doing so, so too have economic
historians. Looking back over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries an
exhaustive search across many diﬀerent sources yields only a handful of
benchmark years in which estimates have been made, an eﬀort that draws
on the work of dozens of scholars in oﬃcial institutions and numerous
other individual eﬀorts.30
It is based on these eﬀorts that we can put together a fragmentary, but still
potentially illuminating, historical description in table 3.2 and ﬁgure 3.3.
Displayed here are nominal foreign investment and output data for major
countries and regions, grouped according to assets and liabilities. Many
cells are empty because data are unavailable, but where possible, summary
data have been derived to illustrate the ratio of foreign capital to output,
and the share of various countries in foreign investment activity.
What do the data show? On the asset side it is immediately apparent that
for all of the nineteenth century, and until the interwar period, the British
were rightly termed the “bankers to the world”; at its peak, the British share
of total global foreign investment was almost 80 percent. This is far above
the recent U.S. share of global foreign assets, a mere 22 percent in 1995, and
still higher than the maximum U.S. share of 50 percent circa 1960. The only
rivals to the British in the early nineteenth century were the Dutch, who ac-
cording to these ﬁgures held perhaps 30 percent of global assets in 1825.
This comes as no surprise given what we know of Amsterdam’s early pre-
eminence as the ﬁrst global ﬁnancial center before London’s rise to domi-
nance in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By the late nineteenth
century both Paris and Berlin had also emerged as major ﬁnancial centers,
and, as their economies grew and industrialized, French and German hold-
ings of foreign capital rose signiﬁcantly, each eclipsing the Dutch position.
In this era the United States was a debtor rather than a creditor nation,
and was only starting to emerge as a major lender and foreign asset holder
after 1900. European borrowing from the United States in World War I then
suddenly made the United States a big creditor. This came at a time when she
was ready, if not altogether willing, to assume the mantle of “banker to the
world,” following Great Britain’s abdication of this position under the bur-
den of war and recovery in the 1910s and 1920s.31 But the dislocations of the
interwar years were to postpone the United States’ rise as a foreign creditor,
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29. An important new source, however, is Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001). See below.
30. See, for example, Paish (1914), Feis (1931), Lewis (1938), Rippy (1959), Woodruﬀ(1967),
and Twomey (2000). Twomey, following Feinstein (1990), favors the estimates of Paish and the
other aforementioned authors, versus the downward revisions to pre-1914 British overseas in-
vestment proposed by Platt (1986).
31. This Anglo-American transfer of hegemonic power is discussed by Kindleberger (1986)
and by Bordo, Edelstein, and Rockoﬀ (1999). Gallarotti (1995) challenges the view that Great
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.and New York’s pivotal role as a ﬁnancial center. After 1945, however, the
United States decisively surpassed Great Britain as the major international
asset holder, a position that has never since been challenged.32
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Fig. 3.3 Foreign capital stocks
Source: Table 3.2.
32. Of course, this is the gross foreign investment position, not the net position. The United
States is also now the world’s number-one debtor nation, in both gross and net terms, having
become a net debtor for the ﬁrst time since the First World War in the late 1980s.How big were nineteenth century holdings of foreign assets? In 1870 we
estimate that foreign assets were just 7 percent of world gross domestic
product (GDP), but this ﬁgure rose quickly, to just below 20 percent in the
years 1900–14 at the zenith of the classical gold standard. During the inter-
war period, the collapse was swift, and foreign assets were only 8 percent of
world output by 1930, 11 percent in 1938, and just 5 percent in 1945. Since
this low point, the ratio has climbed, to 6 percent in 1960, 25 percent in
1980, and then climbing dramatically to 62 percent in 1995. Thus, the 1900–
14 ratio of foreign investment to output in the world economy was not
equaled again until 1980, but has now been approximately tripled.
An alternative measure recognizes the incompleteness of the data sources:
For many countries we have no information on foreign investments at all,
so a zero has been placed in the numerator, although that country’s output
has been included in the denominator as part of the world GDP estimate.
This is an unfortunate aspect of our estimation procedure, and makes the
above ratio likely an underestimate, or lower bound, for the true ratio of for-
eign assets to output. One way to correct this is to include in the denomi-
nator only the countries for which we actually have data on foreign invest-
ment in the numerator.33This procedure yields an estimate we term the ratio
of foreign assets to sample GDP. This is likely an overestimate, or upper
bound, for the true ratio, largely because in historical data, if not in con-
temporary sources, attention in the collection of foreign investment data
has usually focused on the principal players, that is, the countries that have
signiﬁcant foreign asset holdings.34
Given all these concerns, does the ratio to sample GDP evolve in a very
diﬀerent way? No, but the recent upswing is not as pronounced using this
alternative measure. The two ratios are very close after 1980. But before
1945 they are quite far apart: From 1870 to 1914, the sample of seven coun-
tries has a foreign asset to GDP ratio of over 50 percent, far above the world
ﬁgure of 7 to 20 percent. By this measure we only surpassed the 1914 ratio
as recently as 1990, and narrowly even then.
Clearly, these seven major creditors were exceptionally internationally di-
versiﬁed in the late nineteenth century in a way that no group of countries
is today. By this reckoning, in countries like today’s United States, we still
have yet to see a return to the extremely high degree of international port-
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33. That sample of countries is much less than the entire world, as we have noted. Until 1960,
it includes only the seven major creditor countries noted in table 3.2; after 1980, we rely on the
IMF sample from which we can identify up to thirty countries with foreign investment and
GDP data.
34. That is, we are probably restricted in these samples to countries with individually high
ratios of foreign assets to GDP. For example, in the rest of Europe circa 1914, we would be un-
likely to ﬁnd countries with portfolios as diversiﬁed internationally as those of the British,
French, Germans, and Dutch. If we included those other countries it would probably bring our
estimated ratio down. However, in the 1980s and 1990s IMF data, the problem is much less se-
vere since we observe many more countries, and both large and small asset holders.folio diversiﬁcation seen in, say, Great Britain in the 1900–14 period, a his-
torical ﬁnding that places in historical perspective the ongoing interna-
tional diversiﬁcation puzzle.35
Is the picture similar for liabilities as well as assets? Essentially, yes. The
data are much more fragmentary here, with none in the nineteenth century,
when the information for the key creditor nations was perhaps simpler to
collect than data for a multitude of debtors. Even so, we have some esti-
mates running from 1900 to the present at a few key dates. The ratio of lia-
bilities to world GDP follows a path very much like that of the asset ratio,
which is reassuring: They are each approximations built from diﬀerent data
sources at certain time points, although, in principle, they should be equal.
Again, the ratio reaches a local maximum in 1914 of 21 percent, collapsing
in the interwar period to 11 percent in 1938, and just 2 percent in 1960. By
1980 it had exceeded the 1914 level and stood at 30 percent. By 1995, the ra-
tio was 79 percent.
To summarize, data on gross international asset positions seem broadly
consistent with the idea of a U shape in the evolution of international capi-
tal mobility since the late nineteenth century, although it is less clear how
we should compare the degree of diversiﬁcation attained by some countries
then with today’s apparently signiﬁcant, albeit declining, home bias in for-
eign asset holdings. Figuring whether too much or too little diversiﬁcation
existed at any point must remain conjectural, and conclusions would hinge
on a calibrated and estimated portfolio model applied historically. This is
certainly an object for future research. However, unless the global economy
has dramatically changed in terms of the risk-return proﬁle of assets and
their global distribution, we have no prior reason to expect the eﬃcient de-
gree of diversiﬁcation to have changed. For the present we can just say that,
unless such a massive change did occur in the 1914–45 period, and unless it
was then promptly reversed in the 1945–90 period, we cannot explain the
time path of foreign capital stocks seen in table 3.2 and ﬁgure 3.3 except as
a result of a dramatic decline in capital mobility in the interwar period, and
a very slow recovery of capital mobility thereafter.
There is another important dimension of international asset stock data
that we have not yet discussed: the evolution of net stocks, that is, the be-
havior of longer term development ﬂows, as distinct from diversiﬁcation
ﬂows. The literature on the Feldstein-Horioka (1980) paradox alerts us to
the possibility that gross ﬂows are orders of magnitude above net ﬂows. We
postpone discussion of that issue until later.
3.2.2 Real Interest Rate Convergence
A fundamental property of fully integrated international capital markets
is that investors are indiﬀerent on the margin between any two activities to
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35. On the international diversiﬁcation puzzle see Lewis (1999).which they allocate capital, regardless of national location. International
real interest rate equality would hold in the long run in a world where cap-
ital moves freely across borders and technological diﬀusion tends to drive a
convergence process for national production possibilities.36
One basic indication of internationally integrated ﬁnancial markets
therefore would be the statistical stationarity of long-term real interest diﬀ-
erentials. We investigate this property using long-term real interest rate data
constructed from the Global Financial Data database. For a nominal inter-
est rate it we use the monthly series on long-term government bond yields,
which applies to bonds of maturities of seven years or longer. For inﬂation
 t   (P t 12 – P t)/P t we use the ex post twelve-month forward rate of change
of the consumer price index. The ex post real interest rate is then calculated
as r t   it –  t, and for now we make the standard assumption that this is
equal to the ex ante real rate plus a white-noise stationary forecast error. We
focus on real long-term bond yields because these are most directly related
to ﬁnancing costs for capital investments, and hence to the expected mar-
ginal yield on investment. It is the latter variable we would like to be able to
measure directly in order to evaluate the international mobility of capital.37
We consider three countries in our sample, relative to the United States
as a base country. They are Great Britain, France, and Germany. We should
note that the series are as consistent as they can be given the changing types
of domestic bonds issued by the various countries over the last century, al-
though maturities do change at several points for some countries. There are
a few exceptions, such as the British consol, which has a continuous time se-
ries. We also note that prior to 1914 most countries have only annual price
indices, meaning that our derived inﬂation series will also consist of annual
observations, the exceptions being the United States and Great Britain. For
the other two countries, we construct monthly series of ex post real interest
rates by matching monthly nominal interest rates within a year twith the re-
alized inﬂation rate between years t 1 and t. Of course, in measuring long-
term real interest rates, we would like to proxy long-term inﬂation expecta-
tions, but that cannot be done reliably. Thus we follow earlier empirical
studies in utilizing a relatively short-horizon inﬂation measure notwith-
standing the longer term of the corresponding nominal interest rates.
The real interest rate diﬀerential for three countries is shown in ﬁgure 3.4.
This diﬀerential is calculated as r ˜t   rt – rUS,t. This is the ﬁrst time real inter-
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36. We focus on long-term real interest rates here because these rates are most closely linked
to the cost of long-lived capital, because the slow mean reversion in real exchange rates makes
it diﬃcult to discern expected exchange rate changes in short-term data, and because risk pre-
mia can be reduced over long horizons if long-run purchasing power parity holds.
37. For recent data, there is substantial evidence that international real interest rate diﬀer-
entials on short-term bonds are I(0); see, for example, Meese and Rogoﬀ (1988) and Edison
and Melick (1999).est rates over more than a century have been analyzed for this set of coun-
tries at such high frequency, so it is of interest to start by evaluating some
general features of the data. The most striking impression conveyed by the
ﬁgure is that diﬀerentials have varied widely over time, but have stayed rel-
atively close to a zero mean. That is, the series appears to have been sta-
tionary over the very long run, and even in shorter subperiods.
The ﬁgures also reveal some of the changing coherence of real interest
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Fig. 3.4 Long-term real interest diﬀerentials
Notes: See text. The diﬀerential is calculated relative to the United States as r ˜ t   r t – rUS,t.rates in the subperiods. To avoid noisy data from nonmarket periods, the
wartime years (1914–18, 1939–45) have been omitted, as has the German
hyperinﬂation period (1919–23). Again we can focus on the four diﬀerent
subperiods that correspond to the four diﬀerent monetary regimes: the gold
standard (1890–1914), the interwar period (1921–38), Bretton Woods and
the brief transitional period prior to generalized ﬂoating (1951–73), and the
ﬂoat (1974–2000).38
Allowing for the annual inﬂation data used before 1914, we can see that
real interest diﬀerentials became somewhat more volatile in the interwar pe-
riod, with a larger variance (this is less obvious in the German case because
the hyperinﬂation period has been omitted). There is a decline in this
volatility after 1950, and perhaps very little change between the pre-1974
period and the ﬂoat. The latter observation may seem surprising, except
that it is consistent with observations that, aside from nominal and real ex-
change rate volatility, there is little diﬀerence in the behavior of macro fun-
damentals between ﬁxed and ﬂoating rate regimes, at least for developed
countries (e.g., Baxter and Stockman 1989).
With no real interest rate divergence apparent, these ﬁgures provide
prima facie evidence that real interest rates in developed countries have
been cointegrated over time, where the diﬀerentials between countries ap-
pear stationary. A formal test of this hypothesis appears in table 3.3, where
we apply two stationarity tests to the data for the period as a whole, as well
as in various subperiods. The ﬁrst test is the traditional augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) unit root test, and the second is the Dickey-Fuller generalized
least squares (DFGLSu) test, one of a family of enhanced point-optimal
and asymptotically eﬃcient unit root tests recently proposed.39 This table
also reports a broader set of tests for the recent ﬂoat, for an expanded
sample including the Group of Seven (G7) plus the Netherlands, for com-
parison with the contemporary literature.
Where the null is rejected at the 1 percent level, the results show conclu-
sively that the real interest diﬀerential has no unit root over the long run.
Changes in the variances of series over time, of the kind evident in the pre-
ceding ﬁgures, may distort unit root tests (Hamori and Tokihisa 1997).
However, the hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected in almost all cases at
the 1 percent level in all periods except for the recent ﬂoat. With respect to
the recent ﬂoat, the evidence against a unit root is stronger over the second
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38. For the purpose of the present empirical analysis we begin our ﬂoating-rate period in
early 1974 to be consistent with other empirical literature on the real interest rate–real ex-
change rate nexus. However, most historians would place the end of the Bretton Woods system
in August 1971, the month the U.S. oﬃcial gold window was shut.
39. See Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) and Elliott (1999). We use the DFGLSu test
from the latter, which allows for the initial observation to be drawn from the unconditional
mean of the series. The RATS code for this procedure is available online at [http://www.estima.
com].Table 3.3 Stationarity Tests: Long-Term Real Interest Diﬀerentials
Starting Date Ending Date ADF DFGLSu
A. Historical epochs
Great Britain 1890:1 2000:7  –4.30*** –5.54***
France 1890:1 2000:7 –6.05*** –6.36***
Germany 1890:1 2000:7 –4.64*** –5.14***
Great Britain 1890:1 1913:12 –1.38 –3.44***
France 1890:1 1913:12 –3.18** –4.36***
Germany 1890:1 1913:12 –3.86*** –3.70***
Great Britain 1921:1 1938:12 –3.59*** –4.01***
France 1921:1 1938:12 –2.39 –4.31***
Germany 1921:1 1938:12 –2.42 –2.84**
Great Britain 1951:1 1973:2 –5.09*** –5.37***
France 1951:1 1973:2 –3.81*** –3.34***
Germany 1951:1 1973:2 –3.32** –3.51***
B. Recent ﬂoat
Great Britain 1974:2 2000:8 –2.42 –3.75***
The Netherlands 1974:2 2000:8 –2.75* –2.57*
France 1974:2 2000:8 –2.70* –2.52*
Germany 1974:2 2000:8 –2.82* –2.73*
Italy 1974:2 2000:8 –2.52 –2.87**
Japan 1974:2 2000:8 –2.20 –2.52*
Canada 1974:2 2000:8 –3.71*** –3.15**
Great Britain 1974:2 1986:3 –2.61* –2.82**
The Netherlands 1974:2 1986:3 –1.28 –1.19
France 1974:2 1986:3 –2.21 –1.77
Germany 1974:2 1986:3 –1.77 –1.64
Italy 1974:2 1986:3 –2.56 –2.89**
Japan 1974:2 1986:3 –1.50 –1.72
Canada 1974:2 1986:3 –1.92 –1.93
Great Britain 1986:4 2000:7 –2.01 –2.62*
The Netherlands 1986:4 2000:7 –2.61* –2.37
France 1986:4 2000:7 –2.25 –2.50*
Germany 1986:4 2000:7 –3.34** –2.83**
Italy 1986:4 2000:7 –2.54 –2.55*
Japan 1986:4 2000:7 –2.43 –2.55*
Canada 1986:4 2000:7 –0.86 –2.28
Notes:See text. ADF is the augmented Dickey Fuller t-statistic; DFGLSu is the Dickey-Fuller
generalized least-squares test (the test of Elliott 1999). The critical values are, respectively,
(–3.43, –2.86, –2.57) for the ADF test, and (–3.28, –2.73, –2.46) for the DFGLSu test. Lag se-
lection was via the Lagrange multiplier criterion with a maximum of twelve lags.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.subperiod (1986–2000) than over the ﬁrst (1974–86). The above ﬁndings re-
fer to the more powerful DFGLSu test, which rejects the null more fre-
quently than the standard ADF test.
This indication of a stationary long-term real interest diﬀerential, espe-
cially insofar as it applies to the recent period of ﬂoating industrial-country
exchange rates, contradicts much of the empirical literature produced
through the mid-1990s. Why do we ﬁnd more evidence of stationarity than
earlier researchers, such as Meese and Rogoﬀ (1988) and Edison and Pauls
(1993)? We note that previous authors had shorter samples and used tests
of relatively low power, such as the ADF test.
Indeed, our data and methods are consistent with earlier ﬁndings: If we
switch to the Meese-Rogoﬀ sample of February 1974 to March 1986, and
use the ADF test as they did, then we replicate their conclusions exactly (as
shown in the penultimate panel of the table). Even if we switch to the
DFGLSu test on the same data, we can reject the null in only two out of
seven cases. The results for the post-1986 sample show similar problems,
even though for the post-1974 period as a whole we can always reject the
null40 at the 10 percent level or higher.
These ﬁndings, which are supportive of stationarity in recent long-term
real interest diﬀerentials, are consistent with another strand in the literature
that ﬁnds support for international real interest rate equalization at longer
horizons (Fujii and Chinn 2000). We conclude that earlier analyses of re-
cent data were hampered by the low power of unit root tests on samples of
small span.41
3.2.3 Exchange-risk-free Nominal Interest Parity
Perhaps the most unambiguous indicator of capital mobility is the rela-
tionship between interest rates on identical assets located in diﬀerent ﬁnan-
150 Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor
40. Edison and Melick (1999, 97) ﬁnd mixed results on the stationarity of Canadian, Ger-
man, and Japanese long-term real interest diﬀerentials against the United States, but nonethe-
less base their econometric analysis of real interest parity on the assumption that all real in-
terest diﬀerentials are stationary.
41. A more stringent test would examine the validity of long-term real interest parity. A fo-
cus on long-term real rather than nominal interest rate parity seems preferable because with
mean reverting real exchange rates, it is easier to proxy long-run expected real exchange rates
than the corresponding nominal exchange rates. Meese and Rogoﬀ(1988) rejected a version of
real interest parity based on the maintained assumption of an underlying sticky-price ex-
change rate model. More supportive is the recent long-run panel cointegration study by Mac-
Donald and Nagayasu (2000) of fourteen OECD countries relative to the United States. The
statistical methodology of that work, however, assumes that long-term real interest diﬀeren-
tials are nonstationary. Chortareas and Driver (2001) implement a similar approach using a
seventeen-country panel of OECD countries versus the United States; their conclusions are
similar to those of MacDonald and Nagayasu. Chortareas and Driver report mixed results for
tests on the stationarity of long-term real interest diﬀerentials. One issue pervading all of the
work in this area is the eﬀect of alternative proxies for long-term inﬂation expectations. The
proxies that are chosen often diﬀer across authors, aﬀecting some results. A systematic dis-
cussion of these diﬀerences lies beyond the scope of this paper.cial centers.42,43The great advantage of comparing onshore and oﬀshore in-
terest rates such as these is that relative rates of return are not aﬀected by
pure currency risk. For much of the period we study here, a direct onshore-
oﬀshore comparison is impossible. However, the existence of forward ex-
change instruments allows us to construct roughly equivalent measures of
the return to currency-risk-free international arbitrage operations.
Using monthly data on forward exchange rates, spot rates, and nominal
interest rates for 1921 to the latter half of 2001, we assess the degree of in-
ternational ﬁnancial-market integration by calculating the return to cov-
ered interest arbitrage between ﬁnancial centers. For example, a London
resident could earn the gross sterling interest rate 1   it ∗ on a London loan
of one pound sterling. Alternatively, he or she could invest the same cur-
rency unit in New York, simultaneously covering the exchange risk by sell-
ing dollars forward. The investor would do this in three steps: Buy etdollars
in the spot exchange market (where et is the spot price of sterling in dollar
terms); next, invest the proceeds for a total of et (1   it), where it is the nom-
inal dollar interest rate; and ﬁnally, sell that sum of dollars forward for et
(1   it)/ft in sterling (where ft, the forward exchange rate, is the price of for-
ward sterling in terms of forward dollars). The net gain from borrowing in




t  (1   it)   (1   ii∗),
is zero when capital mobility is perfect and the interest rates and forward
rate are free of default risk. The left-hand side of the preceding expression
represents a price of present pounds sterling in terms of future pounds ster-
ling (i.e., of pounds dated t in terms of pounds dated t   1), but it can be
viewed as the relative price prevailing in the New York market, that is, as a
kind of oﬀshore interest rate. Thus, our test, in eﬀect, examines the equal-
ity of the onshore sterling interest rate i∗ with the oﬀshore New York rate
so deﬁned. We perform a similar calculation for German mark interest di-
ﬀerentials between London (considered as the oﬀshore center) and Ger-
many (onshore), thereby gauging the diﬀerence between implicit mark in-
terest rates in London and the rates prevailing near the same time in
Germany.
For pre-1920 data, we examine a related but distinct measure based on
current New York prices of sterling for (two-months) future delivery, as in
Obstfeld and Taylor (1998). The parallel Germany-London arbitrage cal-
culation before 1920, corresponding to the preceding New York-London
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42. See the discussion in Obstfeld (1995), for example.
43. This section draws heavily on Obstfeld and Taylor (1998) for the case of Great Britain,
but adds new data on Germany for comparison. After our 1998 paper was published, we be-
came aware of a similar 1889–1909 U.S.-U.K. interest rate comparison contained in Calomiris
and Hubbard (1996).comparison, is based on London prices for German marks to be delivered
three months in the future. Forward exchange contracts of the kind com-
mon after 1920 were not prevalent before then (except in some exceptional
ﬁnancial centers; see Einzig 1937), so we instead base our pre-1920 com-
parison of onshore and oﬀshore interest rates on the most widely traded in-
strument, one for which prices were regularly quoted in the major ﬁnancial
centers’ markets, the long bill of exchange. Long bills could be used to cover
the exchange risk that might otherwise be involved in interest-rate arbi-
trage.44
To see how such a transaction would work, let bt denote the date-t dollar
price in New York of £1 deliverable in London after sixty days, and et the
spot New York price of sterling.45 One way to purchase a future pound de-
liverable in London would be through a straight sterling loan, at price 1/(1 
it ∗), where it ∗is the London sixty-day discount rate. An alternative would be
to purchase in New York a bill on London, at a price in terms of current
sterling of bt/et. With perfect and costless international arbitrage, these two
prices of £1 to be delivered in London in the future should be the same.
Perkins (1978) observed that the series (e/b) – 1 deﬁnes the sterling inter-
est rate in American ﬁnancial markets, that is, the oﬀshore sterling rate in
the United States. This series may be compared with the London rate i∗, as
we did in our 1998 paper, to gauge the degree of cross-border ﬁnancial in-





    (1   it ∗)
before 1920.
Perkins’s (1978) primary aim was to modify earlier series of dollar-
sterling spot rates derived by Davis and Hughes (1960), who applied U.S.
rather than U.K. interest rates to the dollar prices of long sterling bills in or-
der to infer a series of sight exchange rates. Perkins argued that the sight bill
rate should be derived by multiplying the (lower) long bill rate by a sterling,
not a dollar, interest factor, and subsequent scholars have followed him; see,
for example, the judgment of Oﬃcer (1996, 69). From a theoretical point of
view, the verdict is clear: The relative price of current and future sterling de-
ﬁnes a sterling nominal interest rate, in the present case, the oﬀshore New
York rate that we compare to London rates.
The upper panel of ﬁgure 3.5 is based on monthly diﬀerences between
sterling rates in New York and in London from 1870 to 2001, where we
simply splice together the 1870–1919 numbers based on time bill rates with
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44. Margraﬀ (1908, 37) speaks explicitly of the need to cover interest arbitrage through the
exchange market.
45. In fact, such bills were payable after sixty-three days due to a legal grace period of three
days, an institutional fact we account for in the calculations below (Haupt 1894, 429).the subsequently available covered interest diﬀerentials. Diﬀerential returns
are calculated as annual rates of accrual.46
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Fig. 3.5 Exchange-risk-free nominal interest diﬀerentials since 1870: A, U.S.-U.K.;
B, U.K.-Germany
Sources: See text.
Notes: Annual samples of monthly data, percent per annum. 
46. The U.S.-U.K. comparison is based on the data described in Obstfeld and Taylor (1998,
361n. 7), with the following amendments. From January 1975 to August 2001, the London
sterling interest rate i is the three-month bank bill middle rate, from Datastream. From Janu-
ary 1981 to August 2001, the New York dollar interest rate i is the discount rate on ninety-day
bankers’ acceptances, from Datastream. Finally, from January 1981 to August 2001 spot andThe ﬁgure broadly supports other indicators of the evolution of capital
mobility. Diﬀerentials are relatively small and steady under the pre-1914
gold standard, but start to open up during World War I. They stay quite
large in the early 1920s. Diﬀerentials diminish brieﬂy in the late 1920s, but
widen sharply in the early 1930s. There are some big arbitrage gaps in the
late 1940s through the mid-1950s—including a sharp spike in volatility at
the time of the 1956 Suez crisis.47 But these shrink starting in the late 1950s
and early 1960s, only to open up again in the late 1960s as sterling’s 1967 de-
valuation initiates a period of foreign exchange turmoil, culminating in the
unraveling of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. Interest diﬀer-
entials have become small once again since the disappearance of U.K. cap-
ital controls around 1980. The diﬀerentials appear even smaller now than
before 1914.48
Indeed, for the 1870–1914 data we observe a tendency, quite systematic
albeit declining over time, for New York sterling rates to exceed London
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three-month forward dollar-sterling exchange rates come from Datastream. All of these new
data are end-of-month observations.
For the U.K.-German comparison, data are monthly averages up until January 1981 and
end of month thereafter, as follows. Exchange rates: From October 1877 to July 1914 we use
the month-average spot Mark-sterling exchange rate from the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) macrohistory database, series 14106. London sterling prices for three-
month bills on Berlin are “money” rates taken from the “Course of Exchange” table in The
Economist. From January 1921 to September 1931 we average the weekly spot and three-
month forward exchange rates listed by Einzig (1937). From May 1955 to December 1980, spot
exchange rates are from The Economist through 1957 and thereafter from Datastream. For-
ward exchange rates are from the London Times (May 1955–October 1958), from The Econo-
mistsubsequently through 1964, then from the London Timesthrough 1975, and, ﬁnally, start-
ing January 1976, from Datastream. U.K. three-month interest rate: Open market three-month
discount rate, NBER series 13016, through September 1931. Data from 1955 to 1974 come
from the Federal Reserve banking database (and are similar to the well-known Capie-Webber
series). Starting in January 1975 we use the U.K. interbank (money market) three-month
middle rate of interest. German three-month interest rate: From October 1877 through Sep-
tember 1931, where observations are available, we use the Berlin private open market discount
rate for prime bankers’ acceptances given as NBER series 13018. The German three-month
money market rate for 1955–59 is an average of monthly high and low rates taken from
Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbankand thereafter, through end-1980, comes from the
IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Subsequent data are from Datastream, the three-
month “dead middle” money market rate.
47. See Klug and Smith (1999) for a fascinating empirical study of the Suez crisis. The pa-
per includes a discussion of daily covered arbitrage diﬀerentials from 1 June 1956 to 31 Janu-
ary 1957.
48. We alert the reader to several potential problems with our calculations and data. First,
as we have already stressed above and indeed stressed quite clearly in Obstfeld and Taylor
(1998), the two measures of market integration that we calculate refer to diﬀerent arbitrage
possibilities before and after 1920. Second, some forward transactions appear at diﬀerent ma-
turities in our data set. Third, most data are observed at or near end-of-month, but some data
are averages of weekly numbers. Averaging has the eﬀect of dampening measured volatility.
Fourth, data from World War II reﬂect rigidly administered prices and have no capital mobil-
ity implications. Fifth, the data used are not closely aligned for time of day (and even diﬀer as
to day in some cases), so that some deviations from parity may be exaggerated. The purpose of
the exercise, however, is merely to convey a broad sense of the trend in integration, not to pur-
sue a detailed hunt for small arbitrage possibilities.rates. In arguing in favor of a sterling discount rate for valuing long sterling
bills traded in the United States, Perkins (1978) demonstrated a tendency
for the implicit oﬀshore sterling interest rate (e/b) – 1 to converge toward
bank rate toward the end of the nineteenth century (see his ﬁg. 2, p. 399).
Our ﬁgure 3.5, however, compares the New York oﬀshore sterling interest
rate with the London money-market rate of discount, which tended to be
somewhat below bank rate. Were we to use bank rate as the London inter-
est rate in the ﬁgure, much of the pre-1914 gap would be eliminated. Given
that the U.S. data consist of prices of high-quality paper (such as bank bills),
however, comparisons with bank rate are probably inappropriate. As Spald-
ing (1915, 49) observes: “Bank Rate, as is well known, is usually higher than
market rate; therefore if ordinary trade bills are remitted [to London] from
[abroad], to ﬁnd the long exchange, interest will be calculated at our Bank
Rate, as trade paper is not considered such a good security as bank bills.”49
Oﬃcer (1996, 69) concurs, although on diﬀerent grounds: “Whereas the
Bank Rate was set by the Bank of England, the money-market rate was a
true competitive price....  T h e  money-market rate of discount is the better
measure.”
If it is impermissible to compare the sterling interest rate in New York
with bank rate in London, how, then, can we explain the systematic positive
interest gap in favor of New York before 1914? Much if not all of the gap
can be explained as an artifact of the procedure we have used to extract the
oﬀshore interest rate from the observations on sight and time bill prices.
Continuing our focus on the New York–London comparison of sterling
interest rates, we notice that the published money-market discount rate for
London is quoted as a “pure” relative price of future in terms of present
sterling. In contrast, as practitioners’ textbooks of the period make amply
clear, in determining the price to be paid for a long bill of exchange on Lon-
don, purchasers would factor in not only the spot exchange rate and the
London market discount rate, but, in addition, commissions, proﬁt mar-
gins, and, importantly, the stamp duty (0.05 percent of the bill’s face value)
payable to the British government. These factors made bill prices lower than
they would have been if they simply were equal to the spot exchange rate
discounted by the pure New York sterling rate of interest.
Margraﬀ(1908, 121) estimates that for a ninety-day bill, the total of such
factors amounted to 0.125 percent of face value. For a sixty-day bill, that
charge would represent about 75 basis points in annualized form; Escher
(1918, 81–82), published a decade later, cites a very slightly smaller number.
By subtracting that “tax” from the pre-1914 diﬀerentials plotted in the top
of ﬁgure 3.5, we see that the apparent average excess return in New York dis-
appears.
Indeed, the average return becomes negative for 1890–1914, so that 75
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49. See also the summary table in Margraﬀ (1908, 112).basis points in additional costs may well be an overestimate for the entire
prewar period. Suggestive of declining costs is the tendency shown in the
ﬁgure for the average bias to decline over time. Perkins (1978, 400–01) ar-
gues that U.S. foreign exchange dealers of the period were able to exploit
market power to inﬂate their commissions. Certainly such market power de-
clined through 1914 as markets evolved, and Oﬃcer’s (1996, 75) data on
brokers’ commissions supports this view.50 Of course, a process of market
integration increases competition and drives commissions down. Thus,
leaving aside the portion due to the stamp tax, the size of the New York–
London discrepancy is to some degree a reﬂection of ﬁnancial market seg-
mentation and its secular decline evidence of a process of progressive inte-
gration.
The lower panel of ﬁgure 3.5 shows the diﬀerence between the implicit
mark interest rate in London and the one prevailing in Germany. Again, the
U-shaped evolution of capital mobility is evident over our entire sample pe-
riod. Before 1914, the former, oﬀshore, rate is calculated on the basis of
ninety-day prime bills of exchange on Berlin traded in London. The results
are remarkably consistent with those for New York–London.
In particular, we again observe a systematic but secularly declining excess
return in London prior to 1914. The explanation is essentially the same as
in the New York–London comparison above. Germany levied a stamp duty
on bills at the same rate as Britain’s (0.05 percent; see Haupt 1894, 164, or
Margraﬀ1908, 133). Margraﬀ’s estimates of concomitant costs suggest that
for a ninety-day bill on Berlin, about 40 basis points should be subtracted
from the annualized sight bill premium 4   ([e/b] – 1) to ascertain the true
London mark rate of interest. On the assumption that some costs decline
over time, with 40 basis points an average for the prewar period as whole,
that cost adjustment brings the oﬀshore and onshore mark rates roughly
into line.51
While the cost and tax considerations we have described potentially elim-
inate the pre-1914 upward bias in our estimated series of oﬀshore interest
rates, other ﬁnancial transaction costs would, as usual, create no-arbitrage
bands around the point of onshore-oﬀshore interest rate equality. One way
to evaluate the evolution of capital mobility through time would be to esti-
mate over diﬀerent eras what Einzig (1937, 25) calls “transfer points,” that
is, the minimum return diﬀerential necessary to induce arbitrage opera-
tions. Keynes and Einzig agreed that during the interwar period, at least a
50 basis point covered diﬀerential would be needed to induce arbitrage.
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50. Country-risk-type arguments cannot easily rationalize the pre-1920 interest diﬀerential
in favor of New York, as we pointed out earlier in Obstfeld and Taylor (1998, 361n. 6). The rea-
son is that both of the two transactions we compare entail future payment in the same place,
London. This is not the case in the post-1920 covered interest arbitrage calculations.
51. Flandreau and Rivière (1999) focus on a London-Paris comparison for 1900–14. Their
results are entirely consistent with the data that we show in ﬁgure 3.5, including a systematic
excess of the London franc interest rate over that in Paris. Their rationale for the diﬀerential is
apparently diﬀerent from ours, although they do not include details of their derivation.That is, they suggested a no-arbitrage band of  50 basis points. Applying
nonlinear estimation techniques including a threshold autoregression
(TAR) methodology to weekly interwar data on dollar-sterling covered re-
turn diﬀerentials, Peel and Taylor (2002) conﬁrm that a no-arbitrage band
close to  50 basis points did appear to prevail, as Keynes and Einzig
claimed. Only outside this range did arbitrage forces push spot and forward
exchange rates toward conformity with the band.
A detailed investigation is beyond the scope of this paper, but a ﬁrst pass
at the data using the TAR methodology of Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) is
suggestive. For the dollar-sterling exchange between June 1925 and June
1931, we calculate a band of inaction of  60 basis points, very close to the
Peel-Taylor estimate given that we are using coarser, monthly data. For the
corresponding interwar sterling-mark exchange our estimated band is  91
basis points wide. On 1880–1914 diﬀerentials, in contrast, we ﬁnd (after
subtracting a constant mean diﬀerential) bands of only  19 basis points for
New York–London and  35 basis points for London-Berlin. By way of
comparison, Clinton (1988) suggests that covered interest diﬀerentials in
the mid-1980s needed to reach just  6 basis points to become economically
signiﬁcant. Balke and Wohar (1998) produce an estimate 50 percent higher
for the 1974–93 period. We suspect that a more careful analysis of pre-1914
diﬀerentials, one taking account of the upward trend in market integration,
would reduce our estimated transaction cost bands for the early twentieth
century. Accordingly, the degree of integration among core money markets
achieved under the classical gold standard must be judged as truly impres-
sive compared to conditions over the following half-century or more.
The Great Depression, perhaps as part of a much broader interwar phase
of disintegration, therefore stands out as an event that transformed the
world capital market and left interest arbitrage diﬀerentials higher and
more volatile than ever before.
3.2.4 Equity Returns
It is interesting to ask whether the long-run evidence on the U shape of
capital market integration extends to other criteria, and other markets such
as equities. Over the long run, global equity markets have evolved at a very
diﬀerent rate than global bond markets, for example. Government bonds
from core countries have generally traded in ﬁnancial centers in the last 100
years, but for long spans of time, emerging-market debt was very diﬃcult to
place in the private sector, and most went through multilateral intermedi-
aries. Similarly, international trade in equities, although quiescent in the
middle of the century, grew substantially in core countries after the lifting
of capital controls in the 1970s and 1980s, and by the 1990s several emerg-
ing equity markets were involved as well.
Does quantitative evidence exist to verify this narrative? Quantity data
are harder to ﬁnd at a disaggregated level. Breaking down foreign invest-
ment into its components is an enormous historical task, and few have at-
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tries (but see Twomey 2000). We will not attempt to press further here. In-
stead, we will examine price evidence to see what changing patterns of eq-
uity returns might tell us about globalization.
There is certainly some debate about the indicators of equity returns in
the long run and what they tell us about globalization. Jorion and Goetz-
mann (1999) ﬁnd that most of the world’s stock markets have exhibited
fairly low real returns over the long run in the last century, around 1 per-
cent, with the exception of the United States, which has yielded around 4
percent annually since 1921. These ﬁgures caution that U.S. exceptionalism
might extend to stock market returns also, and cast doubt on the general,
global truth of the equity premium puzzle. The authors also note that sur-
vivorship bias likely aﬄicts the United States and many other markets in the
core countries for which data exist. In many emerging markets, stock prices
have ﬂuctuated wildly and many series break down at critical historical
junctures and during wars, limiting our ability to compare like with like.
In this section we take a fresh look at long-run equity returns using data
similar to those employed by Jorion and Goetzmann (1999), the Global Fi-
nancial Data source. We ask two questions not addressed by previous au-
thors: To what extent have stock returns (measured in a common currency,
the U.S. dollar) diverged or converged over time, and to what extent have the
time series correlations of returns across countries changed over time? We
then consider what the answers may have to say about globalization.
Figure 3.6 shows summary statistics for a sample of up to twenty-two
country stock price indices based on annual U.S. dollar-denominated re-
turns since 1880.52 The bottom chart indicates that the sample size dimin-
ishes markedly prior to 1950, evidence of the survivorship problem. We usu-
ally have twenty countries in the sample after that date, but in the interwar
period the sample size is about a dozen, and before 1920 between ﬁve and
ten. A wide line traces out the sample size for a limited set of core countries,
the G7. For this group there is a more consistent sample size over time, al-
though only three series before 1920.
The middle panel shows the standard deviation of returns across time,
calculated for a centered moving window of ten-year length and encom-
passing the largest sample possible.53 Again, the thin line is the full sample,
the wide line the G7. As a description of the coherence of the returns in G7
equity markets this ﬁgure is strikingly consistent with the U-shape hypoth-
esis and the underlying arbitrage arguments. Returns showed relatively
little dispersion prior to 1914, but larger gaps opened up in the interwar pe-
riod. This dispersion reached a peak around 1945 or 1950, but has been
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52. Since dividend data are not available for the entire sample, the calculated returns are
based on equity price changes only.
53. Speciﬁcally, we plot ten-year averages of the cross-sectional standard deviations of re-
turns.falling since, with a minor reversal in the late 1960s but convergence again
after 1980, roughly when G7 capital controls loosened. The picture for the
full sample is a little less clear, since the sample size is not consistent. We do
not know how much of the long-run increase in dispersion, for example, is
due to an increase in the sample size over time; for example, the addition in
recent years of more volatile emerging markets might be expected to raise
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Fig. 3.6 Equity returns in U.S. dollars for the G7 and up to twenty-two global stock
markets, 1880–2000
Source: Global Financial Data.the variance. But for the post-1950 period, when the sample is stable, the
trends are quite similar to those in the G7, although the returns are much
less coherent than for the G7 in the 1970s and 1980s, a period in which cap-
ital controls were much tighter in the periphery than in the core. It is also
apparent that in the 1990s, the emerging markets have seen a much larger
decline in dispersion, at a time when economic reforms generally reduced
barriers to capital mobility, and emerging market portfolio investment grew
rapidly.
Finally, the top panel explores a second measure of coherence of stock
prices across countries, based on the average correlation of annual dollar re-
turns with that on the U.S. market, again calculated for a centered moving
window of ten-year length and encompassing the largest sample possible,
and where the thin line is the average for the full sample and the wide line
for the G7. The correlations show clear disconnects between markets dur-
ing times of well-known autarky, such as the two world wars. Periods of
high correlation also appear more recently and before 1914 (although only
just before). Although the noisiness of the correlations is quite large, this
much, at least, is consistent with the U-shape story. What is not consistent
with the story is the large spike in cross-country correlations in the 1920s
and 1930s. Why should this be so, in what was an era of supposedly fairly
low capital mobility?
One answer has been provided already by Eichengreen and Sachs (1985,
ﬁg. 5), who show that the interwar patterns may simply reﬂect common
shocks associated with going on and oﬀ the gold standard. To follow their
example, consider the 1929 to 1935 period. Countries that stayed on gold
like France and Germany did endured a brutal downturn in prices and out-
put, whereas countries that devalued did not. This has been empirically
veriﬁed for wider samples such as Latin America (Campa 1990). It is
consistent with monetary explanations of recovery that build on both
the debt-deﬂation logic of Fisher and the expected-real-interest-rate chan-
nel emphasized by Mundell, not to mention the conventional Keynesian
transmission mechanism (Temin 1989; Romer 1992; Eichengreen 1992;
Bernanke and Carey 1996).
What did this mean for stock markets? In a world of nonneutral money,
devaluers would be able to drive up Tobin’s q by restoring positive invest-
ment expectations. Eichengreen and Sachs (1985) found a statistically sig-
niﬁcant correlation between the change in qand the change in the exchange
rate (relative to gold parity) in a sample of nine countries from 1929 to 1935.
We replicate and extend their analysis in ﬁgure 3.7. This ﬁgure shows that
the correlation holds true in a wider sample of eighteen countries.
These results imply that we must therefore be cautious about interpreting
an increased correlation among markets as evidence of globalization per se.
Instead, certain high correlations might simply be a result of common
shocks among a group of countries, in this case countries experiencing, and
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century. This caveat is well known. For example, a recent article in The
Economist (Economics Focus, “Dancing in Step,” 24 March 2001) reports
that in the 1990s global stock market correlations have risen to even higher
levels than in the late 1980s (as high as 0.8 in year 2000, although at what
frequency is not mentioned).54 This came after a decline in correlations in
the early 1990s, but “the long term trend is upward.” Overall, the article
concludes, this is consistent with increased globalization pressures, but cer-
tain large shocks, like the recent crises in Asia, might also have also been as-
sociated with higher correlations via contagion channels. As the article
notes, “stock markets tend to be more correlated at times of high volatility
in share prices; during calmer periods, correlations tend to be weaker.” Sim-
ilar reasoning, of course, could pertain to the roaring twenties and the bust
of the thirties.55
3.2.5 Summary
Many studies of market integration have focused on a single kind of cri-
terion. This approach seems unreasonably restrictive to us, since the inter-
pretation of such narrow criteria must necessarily rest upon untested auxil-
iary assumptions. By contrast, we see no reason to dismiss any useful
information, in either price or quantity form, especially given the paucity of
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Fig. 3.7 Equity markets and the Great Depression, 1929–1935: A, 1935 stock price
in index versus 1935 exchange rate to gold (1929   100); B, 1935 Tobin’s q versus
1935 exchange rate to gold (1929   100)
Sources: Global Financial Data; Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
54. On these correlations see also Gourinchas and Rey (2001) and IMF (2001, 76).
55. The deﬁnition of contagion is controversial: Contagion may entail a structural intensiﬁ-
cation of spillovers in crisis periods. As Forbes and Rigobon (2000) stress, however, higher re-
turn volatility itself can mechanically raise cross-border return correlations even in the absence
of any underlying structural change, and it may be misleading to view this as a contagion eﬀect.historical data in certain quarters. Thus, we have opted for a broad battery
of tests to try to cut down the possible set of explanations that could ac-
count for the empirical record, and so, by a process of elimination, work to-
ward a set on controlled conjectures concerning the evolution of the global
capital market.
The preceding section succinctly conveys the beneﬁts we think this kind
of approach can deliver. Our quantity-based tests delivered a certain set of
stylized facts, and the price-based tests another set of facts. Combining the
two, and introducing evidence on convergence and divergence in other eco-
nomic phenomena such as living standards and demography, we claim there
is overwhelming support for the notion that the major long-run changes in
the degree of global capital mobility have taken the form of changes in the
impediments to capital ﬂows, rather than any encouragement or discour-
agement to ﬂows arising from structural shifts within the economies them-
selves. That is not to discount the fact that such changes have occurred, and
are no doubt important at the margin; but it is an assertion that the virtual
disappearance of foreign capital ﬂows and stocks in midcentury, and the ex-
plosion in price diﬀerentials, can be explained only by an appeal to changes
in arbitrage possibilities as permitted by two major constraining factors in
capital market operations: technology and national economic policies.
From this point, it is a short step to the conclusion that a full accounting
of the phenomena at hand must rest on a detailed political and institutional
history. Clearly, technology is a poor candidate for the explanation of the
twentieth-century collapse of capital mobility. In the 1920s and 1930s, the
prevailing ﬁnancial technologies were not suddenly forgotten by market
participants: Indeed some technologies, such as futures markets for foreign
exchange, came to fruition in those decades. Technological evolution was
not smooth and linear, but as we have already noted, was at least unidirec-
tional, and, absent any other impediments, would have implied an uninter-
rupted progress toward an ever more tightly connected global marketplace.
Such was not allowed to happen, of course. Rather, the shifting forces of
national economic policies, as inﬂuenced by the prevailing economic theo-
ries of the day, loomed large during and after the watershed event of the
twentieth century, the economic and political crisis of the Great Depres-
sion. Understanding the macroeconomic and international economic his-
tory of the last century in these terms, and the changes it wrought for the
operation of the global capital market, is a long and complex story, a nar-
rative that properly accompanies the empirical record presented in this pa-
per, and we take up some of the political economy dimensions of that story
in the section that follows.
3.3 Political Economy
We have thus far amassed evidence that international capital mobility
has experienced two major swings over the course of the twentieth century:
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postwar years. The timing is hard to pin down precisely, and, indeed, surely
varied by country and by the type of capital movements being considered.
Taking this as given, we now must ask why capital mobility followed this
path, and what corroborative evidence we can assemble to buttress an ac-
count of these events that incorporates the forces of political economy. We
start ﬁrst with the downturn in capital mobility after 1914.
3.3.1 The Downturn
The conventional macrohistorical account of the collapse of capital
mobility after 1914 focuses on the trilemma, as we have noted, (Eichen-
green 1996; Obstfeld and Taylor 1998). The literature suggests that the ma-
jor political economy forces at work during this period were increasing
pressure for macroeconomic activism, particularly from newly or better-
enfranchised groups such as the working classes. If ﬁxed exchange rates
were to be maintained, then capital mobility would have to be compro-
mised, at least on some occasions. Maintenance of capital mobility instead
would preclude an exchange rate target. Either option would raise uncer-
tainty for investors.
It is believed that prior to 1914, gold standard orthodoxy had been a sine
qua non for access to global capital markets on favorable terms. A ﬁrst
study by Bordo and Rockoﬀ (1996) found that adherence to gold standard
rules acted as a “seal of approval” for sovereign debt. Gold standard coun-
tries had lower country risk, measured by the bond spread in London over
the British consol.56 Accordingly, evidence of a new political dynamic after
1914 might be seen in a changing relationship between country risk and
gold after the gold standard was reconstituted starting in 1925. With the
rules of the game in question after World War I, investors might have
doubted whether the announcement of a gold standard commitment alone
would signal credibility. In addition, public solvency indicators, such as
debt-GDP ratios, or inﬂation, might be seen as having a bigger impact on
international bond spreads under the reconstituted gold standard than be-
fore. Do such doubts manifest themselves in the data?
There is no uniform and comprehensive study of bond spreads across
these two eras that would allow us deﬁnitively to answer this question, but
a second study by Bordo, Edelstein, and Rockoﬀ (1999) came to a conclu-
sion that was surprising, even by the authors’ own admission. Looking
solely at 1920s bonds they found continued evidence that the gold standard
remained a seal of approval, lowering bond spreads signiﬁcantly, at least
when a country stuck to its prewar parity. Devaluers were not so lucky with
their bond spreads, since for them, the impact of being on gold was small
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56. Clemens and Williamson (2000), however, ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant gold standard
eﬀect on the shares of British capital ﬂows to various foreign recipients during 1870–1913. It
remains to reconcile the apparently conﬂicting message of the price and quantity data.and statistically insigniﬁcant. Such a conclusion challenged the conven-
tional wisdom that the interwar gold standard was a pale and less credible
shadow of its predecessor.
These are two pioneering studies but, for comparative work across
regimes, they are not ideal. Unfortunately, they cannot be merged together
into a consistent picture because of diﬀerences in the methods and data em-
ployed. The former study looked at long-term government bonds in the sec-
ondary market, and examined their yield to maturity; the latter examined
new issues and their yield at the moment of ﬂotation only. The former study
therefore had complete time series, whereas the latter had a small sample
that was often interrupted by missing data in years when no issues took
place—a not uncommon event in the 1920s, and one that could raise a po-
tential sample-selection issue. Finally, the former studied prices in London,
the latter prices in New York, a switch that could be defended as the hege-
monic center of global capital markets shifted across the Atlantic around
this time, and one that allowed the use of Cleona Lewis’ (1938) data on new
issues for the 1920s.
To  overcome the diﬀerences between these studies, we reexamine the
question of what determined bond spreads in the pre-1914 and interwar
years using a much larger database that allows us to view a consistent set of
data for a larger sample of countries from 1870 to 1940. In the Global Fi-
nancial Data source and other primary sources we found the yields to ma-
turity of government bonds traded in London for this entire period, and we
focus on more than twenty countries, some in the core and some in the pe-
riphery, to see how their country risk evolved. This allows us to focus on the
same market and the same type of risk measure across both eras. To isolate
the eﬀects of default risk, our spreads over London are exclusively for
bonds denominated in gold or in sterling.
Figure 3.8 oﬀers an overview of the data. The mean bond spread for the
core and periphery subsamples is presented in the top and bottom panels,
respectively, and each is surrounded by a measure of dispersion, a band
equal to  2 standard deviations. The units are percentage points and the
scales are deliberately the same on the two charts.57
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57. Country risk is calculated as the spread between the country’s long bond, denominated
in hard currency or gold (the external London bond), and the British consol. The core and em-
pire countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, India, New Zealand, Norway,
South Africa, Sweden, and the United States. The periphery countries are Argentina, Austria
(or Austria-Hungary, before World War I), Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Finland, Greece, Hungary
(after World War I), India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and Uruguay. There
are occasional missing data, due to the fact that bonds are recorded by Global Financial Data
(GFD) in domestic currency (paper) only or are not recorded at all. Notable gaps are Ar-
gentina (1935–40), Austria (1933–40), Chile (1934–40), Denmark (1870–1918), Finland
(1870–1910), Greece (1927–40), Mexico (1933–40), Sweden (1933–40), Uruguay (1934–40),
and several countries around the time of World War I (1914–18). We supplement the GFD
source as follows: For Argentina we use improved data from della Paolera (1988) and Naka-
mura and Zarazaga (2003). For the United States (1870–1914) we follow Bordo and RockoﬀThe diﬀerences between the two subsamples are very striking: The core had
much smaller country risk than the periphery, as expected. Core countries
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Fig. 3.8 London bond spreads, core and periphery, 1870–1940
Source: Global Financial Data
Notes: See footnote 57.
(1996), who use Calmoiris’ adjusted gold rate, since at this time government bonds bore silver
risk. For interwar Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Sweden,
Turkey, and Uruguay, GFD does not report gold or sterling bonds, so we collected new inter-
war-yield data on London sterling or gold bonds from Investor’s Monthly Manual, The Times,
The Wall Street Journal, and The Economist. For further details see Obstfeld and Taylor (forth-
coming).usually had interest rates within 1 or 2 percentage points of Great Britain’s.
The periphery could have spreads as large as 10 percentage points, which was
tantamount to having a bond in default in many cases. But the ﬁgures also
show some similarities, once we normalize for this scale diﬀerence: Both core
and periphery experienced a convergence in bond spreads up to 1914, and
then a good deal of volatility in the interwar years, when spreads widened.
The gradual convergence of bond spreads warns us that a simple static
“on and oﬀ” gold indicator is unlikely to capture the full dynamics of evolv-
ing country risk in this period. Intuitively, these ﬁgures hint at high levels of
persistence or serial correlation in bond spreads, and it is easy to imagine
why. Bond spreads are a function of reputation, which, in capital markets
as in any other repeated game, cannot be built overnight. Instead, there is
an “I know what you did last summer” eﬀect: One’s reputation in the previ-
ous period is likely to have substantial explanatory power in deciding one’s
reputation today. Beyond this, levels of public indebtedness were relevant
for at least some countries. A general concern is that macroeconomic vari-
ables correlated with gold standard adherence might be responsible for the
apparent pre-1914 beneﬁts of going on gold, or might mask such beneﬁts
after the First World War. Before the war, countries on gold may have had
more disciplined ﬁscal policies, lower public debt, and hence more favor-
able treatment by the bond markets. On the other hand, perhaps countries
that inﬂated away their public debts in the early or mid-1920s would have
been unlikely to rejoin gold at parity, making high public debts and a return
to gold at prewar parity positively correlated variables. In these circum-
stances, omitting macrocontrols could lead us to overestimate the prewar
beneﬁt of gold standard adherence and underestimate the postwar beneﬁt
of returning to gold at the prewar par.58
Following Bordo and Rockoﬀ (1996), we investigate the relationship be-
tween the dependent variable country risk, measured by the bond spread
over London, SPREADit   YIELDit – YIELDUK,t, and selected macroeco-
nomic policy variables that could play a role for country i and time t. One
such variable is gold standard adherence, measured by two dummy vari-
ables: GSPARit, which takes the value 1 if on date t country i is on gold at
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58. Flandreau, Le Cacheux, and Zumer (1998) argue that a major factor driving the evident
convergence of bond spreads after the early 1890s and through 1914 is worldwide inﬂation re-
sulting from gold discoveries, a factor that caused both an unexpected reduction in countries’
ratios of public debt to nominal GDP and a more widespread adherence to the gold standard.
For the pre-1914 period, Flandreau, Le Cacheux, and Zumer investigate borrowing spreads
over London using an all-European country sample diﬀerent from that of Bordo and Rockoﬀ
(1996) and an econometric speciﬁcation encompassing the public debt ratio to GDP as well as
gold standard adherence. They report beneﬁts from gold standard adherence on the order of
35–55 basis points. They also ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of public debt on borrowing spreads. (Bordo
and Rockoﬀ included the public deﬁcit in their estimating equation but found little eﬀect.) It
is possible in principle that some of the beneﬁts ascribed by Bordo and Rockoﬀ to gold stan-
dard adherence before 1914 can be accounted for by a tendency of association with more mod-
erate real public debt levels, a point that provides a strong rationale for including the debt as
an explanatory variable.the 1913 parity, and GSDEV it, which takes the value 1 if the country is on
gold at a devalued parity after 1913. Monetary policy reputation is proxied
by the lagged inﬂation rate, INFLi,t–1. As a ﬁnal macroexplanatory variable,
we examine the eﬀects of lagged public debt levels, measured by the ratio of
debt to output, PUBDGDP i,t–1. We also include country ﬁxed eﬀects to cap-
ture constant but unmeasured political, economic, institutional, or geo-
graphic features of individual countries (e.g., location on the periphery).
Like Bordo and Rockoﬀ (1996), we also ﬁnd it necessary to account for
global interest rate shocks that aﬀect spreads in all markets in a given year.
To do this, following the logic of the “international capital asset pricing
model,” we include (with a country-speciﬁc slope, or  ) a measure of mar-
ket risk in the form of SPREADW,t   YIELDWORLD,t – YIELDUK,t, where
this term is the (1913 GDP-weighted) average world spread on the “safe
rate” (London) for the countries in the sample at time t.59,60
Using pooled annual data for a large sample of countries, the basic re-
gression equation is then of the form
(4) SPREADit    i    iSPREADW,t    Xit   uit
where
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59. We experimented with other ways to control for time-speciﬁc asset market shifts, such as
simple time dummies, but the results appear robust.
60. Bond spread series as described in footnote 57.
Gold standard adherence data are from Meissner (2001) and Obstfeld and Taylor (forth-
coming), available for all countries in all years. Other variables are available for only a subset
of years and countries, and this restricts the sample in our econometric tests accordingly.
Central-government public debt data (mostly starting in 1880) come from Bordo and Jo-
nung (1996) for a sample of fourteen countries consisting of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands (starting 1900), Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland (starting 1913), the United Kingdom, and the United States. For those countries,
the same source has data on nominal GDP. After 1914, we augment our other public debt data
with the total central government debts reported by United Nations (1948); and we use the
nominal GDP ﬁgures from Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) or GFD. Additional sources for debt
were as follows. Argentina: della Paolera (1988). Australia: Barnard (1987). Austria-Hungary:
Niall Ferguson, based on data collected by Marc Flandreau (unpublished). Brazil: IBGE
(1990) and Levy (1995). Chile: Mamalakis (1978–89). Egypt: Niall Ferguson, based on
Crouchley (1938). India: Reserve Bank of India (1954). New Zealand: Lloyd Prichard (1970).
Portugal: Valério (2001). Spain: Barciela and Carreras (1989). Turkey: Tezel (1986). Uruguay:
unpublished data from Reto Bertoni, kindly provided by Luis Bértola, and based on the oﬃ-
cial data from Anuarios Estadísticos. Debts relative to nominal GDP were calculated using
nominal GDP data from Mitchell (1992, 1993, 1995), collated or augmented by Bordo and
Schwarz (1997) and GFD, interpolated or supplemented by other sources as follows. Ar-
gentina: della Paolera and Ortiz (1995). Austria-Hungary: Niall Ferguson, based on data col-
lected by Marc Flandreau (unpublished). Egypt: Yousef (forthcoming). France: Jones and Ob-
stfeld (2001). India: Goldsmith (1983). New Zealand: Hawke (1975) and Lineham (1968).
Portugal: Nunes, Mata, and Valério (1989). Spain: Prados (2002). Uruguay: Bértola (1998)
and Bertino and Tajam (2000).is the vector of explanatory variables. (We also tried interacting debt and in-
ﬂation with a dummy variable equal to 1 for the periphery countries, not in-
cluding regions of the British Empire, to capture the possibly diﬀerent risk
treatment of established versus emerging markets, but the results were in-
signiﬁcant and are therefore not reported.)61 The main question we ask is
whether 1914 was a watershed—that is, if the interwar gold standard di-
ﬀered from its predecessor. Accordingly, we investigate this relationship on
prewar (1870–1913) and interwar (1925–31) samples.
In tables 3.4 and 3.5 we report results for the prewar (1870–1913, using
December yields) and interwar (1925–31, using June yields) periods. Since
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We also tried using deﬁcit-to-GDP ratios, following Bordo and Rockoﬀ (1996), but, like
them, we found deﬁcit ratios to be statistically insigniﬁcant in preliminary testing.
Inﬂation data are based on consumer (or GDP) price indices taken from Obstfeld and Taylor
(2003), Bordo and Schwarz (1997), and GFD, supplemented by other sources above or as fol-
lows. Argentina: Irigoin (2000); Cortés Conde (1989); and from della Paolera and Ortiz (1995).
Austria-Hungary: Schulze (2000). Chile: Braun et al. (2000). Egypt: Yousef (forthcoming). In-
dia: Goldsmith (1983). New Zealand: an implicit deﬂator of GDP, based on nominal GDP as
above, and real GDP from Maddison (1995). Portugal: Nunes, Mata, and Valério (1989).
We are unable to make our pre-1914 analysis of spread-debt relationships comparable with
that of Flandreau, Le Cacheux, and Zumer (1998), as their data set, which comprises a diﬀer-
ent country sample than ours, has not been made available. Besides apparently covering the
countries in our prewar sample, excluding Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, and the United
States, Flandreau and colleagues’ sample adds public debt data for Switzerland and some ad-
ditional “European peripheral” countries. Judging from the 1892 data from Haupt (1894)
graphed by Dornbusch (1998), the European peripheral countries had signiﬁcant public debts
relative to GDP.
61. The core and empire countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and
the United States. The periphery countries are Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile, Finland,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, and Uruguay. See ﬁgure 3.8.
Table 3.4 Country Risk and the Gold Standard, 1870–1913
OLS AR1
N 563 546
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.84
Mean of dependent variable 1.72 1.70
Standard error of dependent variable 1.52 1.51
Standard error of estimate 0.86 0.60
Durbin-Watson statistic 0.59 1.37
GS –0.39 (0.16) –0.50 (0.19)
PUBDGDP(t – 1) –0.05 (0.14) 0.06 (0.22)
INFL(t – 1) 0.69 (0.48) 0.75 (0.03)
  — 0.75 (0.03)
Sources: See text and footnotes 57 and 60.
Notes: The dependent variable is SPREAD as in ﬁgure 3.8. Standard errors appear in paren-
theses. Country ﬁxed eﬀects ( i) and betas ( i) are not reported. The seventeen countries in
the unbalanced panel are Argentina, Australia, Austria-Hungary, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Egypt, India, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United States,
and Uruguay. There are some missing data. In the AR1 model a common autoregressive pa-
rameter   applies to all countries.Globalization and Capital Markets 169
Table 3.5 Country Risk and the Gold Standard, 1925–31
OLS AR(1)
N 160 137
Adjusted R2 0.92 0.93
Mean of dependent variable 0.94 0.88
Standard error of dependent variable 1.21 1.15
Standard error of estimate 0.34 0.31
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.79 1.87
GSPAR –0.31 (0.12) –0.25 (0.11)
GSDEV –0.60 (0.18) –0.52 (0.17)
PUBDGDP(t – 1) 1.24 (0.44) 1.64 (0.44)
INFL(t – 1) 0.14 (0.08) 0.00 (0.12)
  — 0.37 (0.05)
Sources: See table 3.4.
Notes: GSPAR denotes gold standard restored at the 1913 parity; GSDEV denotes gold stan-
dard restored at a devalued parity. The twenty-three countries in the unbalanced panel are Ar-
gentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, Finland,
France, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South
Africa, Sweden, the United States and Uruguay.
we are focusing on spreads against London, and we implicitly treat London
as a benchmark of what is a safe yield under gold standard credibility, we
omit all other interwar years in our sample. Column (1) shows the ordinary
least squares (OLS) results, while column (2) adds an autoregression (AR1)
correction since we ﬁnd evidence of high serial correlation in column (1).62
Being on gold appears statistically signiﬁcant before 1914, subtracting
about 50 basis points from the spread over London. But being on gold at
the 1913 parity appears to be only about half as valuable for the interwar
years 1925–31.
Public debt and inﬂation are seen to have had eﬀects that were quantita-
tively small and of low statistical signiﬁcance in the prewar period. The pre-
war autoregressive parameter is quite high, 0.75, suggesting that during the
classical gold standard period countries could rely on some reputational
persistence to help them maintain credibility in the capital market. Before
1914, then, classical gold standard adherence alone seems to have been
suﬃcient to warrant the market “seal of approval.”63,64
62. Using mid-year data interwar expands the time dimension to seven years, since June
1925 follows British resumption and June 1931 precedes British suspension of the gold stan-
dard. For the prewar period, the Durbin-Watson statistics for the uncorrected equations are
very low. The AR1 model was also used by Bordo and Rockoﬀ(1996). Flandreau, Le Cacheux,
and Zumer (1998) add additional controls, the export-to-output ratio and output per capita,
which appear to soak up some serial correlation.
63. According to our AR(1) estimate, for example, a debt-GDP ratio of 100 percent, as-
suming linearity, would raise the cost of foreign borrowing by only 6 basis points per year. Ev-
idently, markets believed that prewar gold standard countries would take the steps needed to
make good on their debts.
64. Flandreau, Le Cacheux, and Zumer (1998, 145) conclude that before 1914, “countries
had to plunge quite deep into debt before they started feeling the pain.” Core countries gener-It is important to note that this pattern does not hold for the interwar pe-
riod. For that era, the market seems to have been more discerning in its
scrutiny of all borrowers’ public debt data (although inﬂation remains
unimportant). In these samples we also ﬁnd somewhat weaker evidence of
reputational persistence (as measured by the autoregressive parameter of
0.37), perhaps further evidence of the fragile credibility associated with the
interwar gold standard where markets seemed to discount reputation.
Our estimates suggest that an interwar increase in public debt equivalent
to 10 percentage points of GDP could raise spreads by 12 to 16 basis points.
By this measure, the sensitivity of bond spreads to debt was much larger af-
ter the war than before.
These ﬁndings may help us to understand why many policymakers in the
1920s and 1930s so feared the market response to unbalanced public bud-
gets, notwithstanding the countercyclical case for ﬁscal expansion (James
2001). In this period, being on gold was not, in itself, enough to soothe mar-
kets.
A noteworthy ﬁnding in the 1925–31 results of table 3.5 is that returning
to gold at a devalued parity is estimated to have fully twice the beneﬁcial
eﬀect of returning at prewar parity, very much contrary to the Bordo-
Edelstein-Rockoﬀ empirical result. This ﬁnding supports the theoretical
view of Drazen and Masson (1994) that policymakers may hurt rather than
enhance their credibility through policies that appear tough in the short
term but are too draconian to be sustained for long. It also shows that in-
terwar markets could forgive the expropriation of prior bondholders, pro-
vided the current economic fundamentals looked sustainable.
One concern about the results of table 3.5 is that they may conﬂate the
beneﬁts countries gained when they returned to gold with the spread eﬀects
of the dire circumstances in which countries left gold (never to return) prior
to Great Britain’s own departure in September 1931. Our on-gold dummy
captures the complement of the set of all dates on which a country was on
gold. Thus, we may overstate the case for gold by viewing the eﬀects of the
gathering Great Depression simply as a market response to gold abandon-
ment.
To address such an overstatement we add a third dummy, GSOFF, which
takes a value of 1 for years in which a country was off gold following a prior
interwar resumption. Table 3.6reports the results of estimation. In these re-
gressions, the eﬀect of returning to gold at par is wiped out, whereas the
eﬀect of returning at devalued parity, although smaller than in table 3.5
(around 40 basis points now), remains signiﬁcant. Being forced oﬀ of gold
raised spreads by 50–60 basis points, and the eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant.
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ally had public debt levels at which, according to the authors, “markets did not inﬂict massive
punishments.” Unlike in our sample, as we have noted, those authors do ﬁnd that debt raised
spreads before 1914.These results are not surprising. Primary exporting countries such as Ar-
gentina, Australia, and Uruguay returned to gold at par only to be forced
oﬀ in 1929–30 amid sharply higher external borrowing costs. The signiﬁ-
cant negative coeﬃcient on GSPAR in table 3.5 mainly reﬂects the fact that
these countries enjoyed lower external borrowing costs before the onset of
the Depression. (For the same reason, estimating over the truncated period
1925–30 attenuates the eﬀect of GSPAR.) Both the Drazen-Masson eﬀect
and the importance of public debt remain, however, in table 3.6, so these
may be regarded as robust features of the interwar capital market.
In Obstfeld and Taylor (forthcoming), we explore a different speciﬁca-
tion, but our main conclusions do not change very much. Accounts of the
Great Depression (such as Kindleberger 1986) emphasize the role of ad-
verse terms of trade shocks in forcing primary exporters to leave gold prior
to Great Britain’s own 1931 departure. Thus, we add the terms of trade as
an explanatory variable in our equation but omit GSOFF. We also allow for
the spread effects of countries’ default statuses. The most notable change
from the preceding results is a decline in the prewar “good housekeeping”
effect to roughly  25 basis points, an estimate that remains highly statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. The terms of trade are a signiﬁcant determinant of spreads
between the wars but not prior to 1914.
To  recapitulate: Unlike Bordo, Edelstein, and Rockoﬀ (1999), we ﬁnd
very diﬀerent behavior of bond spreads in relation to the gold standard over
the interwar period 1925–31 as compared to the pre-1914 period. This may
be ascribed mainly to diﬀerences in concept (use of around-secondary-
market bond yields in London versus new issues in New York) and diﬀer-
ences in macroeconomic control variables (government debt rather than
deﬁcit). Of these features in our empirical approach, the ﬁrst, at least, seems
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Table 3.6 Country Risk and the Gold Standard, 1925–31
OLS AR(1)
N 160 137
Adjusted R2 0.93 0.93
Mean of dependent variable 0.94 0.88
Standard error of dependent variable 1.21 1.15
Standard error of estimate 0.33 0.30
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.77 1.71
GSPAR –0.02 (0.15) 0.04 (0.13)
GSDEV –0.45 (0.18) –0.37 (0.17)
GSOFF 0.53 (0.17) 0.58 (0.17)
PUBDGDP(t – 1) 1.08 (0.43) 1.41 (0.42)
INFL(t – 1) 0.14 (0.08) 0.04 (0.10)
  — 0.40 (0.05)
Sources: See table 3.5.
Notes: GSOFF denotes gold standard suspension after interwar resumption.necessary if we are to make comparisons on an equal footing with Bordo
and Rockoﬀ (1996).
Before 1914, we ﬁnd that the gold standard did indeed confer a “seal of
approval,” with macrofundamentals such as public debt and inﬂation mat-
tering little. For the interwar period, a return to gold after devaluation (as
in the case of France) seemed more credible, notwithstanding the argu-
ments that led Great Britain and other countries to return to gold at par; in-
deed, returning at par yielded small beneﬁts at best. Moreover, for core and
periphery countries alike, high public debts were punished, suggesting that
policymakers’ room for maneuver was further curtailed.
Our results both on the drop in spreads associated with going on gold,
and on markets’ diﬀerential response to public debt prewar versus interwar,
suggest that the interwar gold standard was indeed seen as diﬀerent and less
credible than its pre-1914 predecessor. It remains fully to reconcile these re-
sults with ﬁndings such as those of Hallwood, MacDonald, and Marsh
(1996) that indicate a highly credible gold standard during the late 1920s, at
least in the short term. Perhaps the bond markets adopted a longer per-
spective under which protracted adherence to unchanging gold parities
seemed less probable than short-term adherence.
3.3.2 The Upturn
After the immediate post–World War II dislocations, the world economy
began to reconstitute its severed linkages, a process both promoting and
promoted by the return of some degree of durable prosperity and peace.
Postwar policymakers, through the IMF, successive multilateral trade lib-
eralization rounds, current account currency convertibility, and other mea-
sures, successfully promoted growing world trade. By the late 1960s, the
very success of these initiatives in forging trading linkages among countries
simultaneously made capital ﬂows across borders ever more diﬃcult to con-
tain. As a result, the trilemma reemerged with full force, and on a global
scale, in the early 1970s. The Bretton Woods system, initially designed for a
world of tightly controlled capital movements, blew apart. The major in-
dustrial countries retreated to ﬂoating exchange rates.
While initially viewed as a temporary expedient, ﬂoating rates have re-
mained a durable feature of the international ﬁnancial landscape. Floating
rates helped reconcile the social demand for domestic macroeconomic sta-
bilization with the interest of the business community for open markets
in goods and assets. Some episodes of exchange rate misalignment have
prompted calls for renewed protection and even capital account restric-
tions. Some of these calls have been accommodated, but usually not in the
form of across-the-board restrictions on international transactions.
Other forces have also helped to promote liberalization. In Europe, the
political and economic rationales for a large single market have prompted
ongoing ﬁnancial liberalization; at the same time, the political (and, some
argue, economic) imperative of stable exchange rates has pushed toward the
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have opted for ﬁxed exchange rates, either by some form of ultrahard peg or
outright dollarization, in either case bending to the trilemma by giving up
monetary policy autonomy.
Since the late 1980s, the drive toward capital account liberalization in the
developing world is probably the most striking pattern in the evolution of
global capital markets. Clearly one element has been the widespread failure
in the periphery of populist policies adopted in the 1980s and earlier. Reac-
tions to those failures gave free-market ideologies a greater inﬂuence. On a
larger scale, the collapse of the Soviet empire in the late 1980s also high-
lighted the advantages of the capitalist model. The resulting decline in Cold
War tensions certainly held out the promise of greater ﬂuidity in private in-
ternational capital. Whether exchange rates ﬂoat or are ﬁxed, there is much
greater openness to private ﬁnancial ﬂows on the periphery than in the
1980s. In part a reﬂection of U.S. business interests, American administra-
tions have pushed developing economies to liberalize on capital account; in
some cases, liberalization ran far ahead of domestic ﬁnancial systems’ ab-
sorptive capacities, and clashed with national exchange rate policies. The
resulting contradictions helped spark the developing-country currency
crises of the latter 1990s. To attract productive capital from the industrial
world remains a prime goal on the periphery, however, and that requires
market-oriented reforms, stable macropolicies, and transparency in gover-
nance and legal systems.
There is, however, one critical dimension in which pre-1914 international
capital ﬂows diﬀer sharply in nature from what we see today, with impor-
tant implications for the periphery; to see this we return to the distinction
between net and gross international asset stocks. A cursory glance at the
data reveals that this problem is very serious in recent decades but was rel-
atively unimportant in the pre-1914 era of globalization. The reason is
simple: In the late nineteenth century the principal ﬂows were long-term in-
vestment capital, and virtually unidirectional at that. There was one notable
exception, the United States, where both inﬂows and outﬂows were large.
But in most cases key creditor nations, principally Great Britain but also
France and Germany, engaged in the ﬁnancing of other countries’ capital
accumulation, and in doing so, developed enormous one-way positions in
their portfolios.
For example, circa 1914 the scale of Argentine assets in Great Britain’s
portfolio was very large, but the converse holding of British assets by Ar-
gentines was trivial by comparison. Thus, the nineteenth century was an era
of one-way asset shifts, leading to great portfolio diversiﬁcation by the prin-
cipal creditor-outﬂow nations like Great Britain, but relatively little diver-
siﬁcation by the debtor-inﬂow nations. To a ﬁrst approximation, the gross
asset and liability positions were very close to net in that distant era. The
1980s and 1990s are obviously very diﬀerent: For example, the United
States became in this period the world’s largest net debtor nation. While ac-
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the United States also held the largest stock of gross foreign assets.
Our earlier discussion of the gross stock data, and our inferences con-
cerning the recovery of foreign assets and liabilities in the world economy
after 1980, therefore need considerable modiﬁcation to take into account
this problem. Indeed, it is a signiﬁcant problem for all of the countries con-
cerned: The ranking of countries by foreign assets in the IMF data is very
highly correlated with the ranking by foreign liabilities. Countries such as
Great Britain, Japan, Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands are all big
holders of both foreign assets and liabilities. Strikingly, when we net out the
data the result is that, since 1980, the net foreign asset position (or liability)
positions in the world economy have remained very low indeed, as indicated
by ﬁgure 3.9. Unlike the gross stocks, the net stocks have increased little,
and if we trust the asset data rather more (arguably more of the net asset
data are collected in richer industrial countries with better accounting
methods), then the picture is one of relative decline in the size of net foreign
capital stocks relative to GDP.
Thus, for all the suggestion that we have returned to the pre-1914 type of
global capital market, here is one major qualitative diﬀerence between then
and now. Today’s foreign asset distribution is much more about asset swap-
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Fig. 3.9 Foreign capital stocks: Net versus gross
Source: IMF.ping by rich countries—diversiﬁcation—than it is about the accumulation
of large one-way positions—a critical component of the development pro-
cess in poorer countries in standard textbook treatments. It is therefore
more about hedging and risk sharing than it is about long-term ﬁnance and
the mediation of saving supply and investment demand between countries.
In the latter sense, we have never come close to recapturing the heady times
of the pre-1914 era, when a creditor like Great Britain could persist for
years in satisfying half of its accumulation of assets with foreign capital, or
a debtor like Argentina could similarly go on for years generating liabilities
of which one-half were taken up by foreigners. Instead, still to a very great
extent today, a country’s net wealth will depend, for accumulation, on the
provision of ﬁnancing from domestic rather than foreign sources (Feldstein
and Horioka 1980).
An interesting, and closely related, insight also follows from looking at
the share of less developed countries (LDCs) in global liabilities. This is now
at an all-time low. In 1900, LDCs in Asia, Latin America, and Africa ac-
counted for 33 percent of global liabilities; in the 1990s, only 11 percent (ﬁg.
3.3). The global capital market of the nineteenth century centered on Eu-
rope, especially London, extended relatively more credit to LDCs than does
today’s global capital market. Is this surprising? There are various interpre-
tations for this observation. One is that capital markets are biased now, or
were biased in the past; for example, did Great Britain, as an imperial
power, favor LDCs within her orbit with ﬁnance? Or, today, does the global
capital market fail in the sense that there are insuﬃcient capital ﬂows to
LDCs, and an excess of ﬂows among developed countries? These are hard
claims to prove, as market failure could be a cause, as could a host of other
factors including institutions and policies aﬀecting the marginal product of
capital in diﬀerent locations. Of course, this result just follows from the fact
that many of the top asset holders also ﬁgure in the top liability holders, and
most of them are developed OECD countries.
Figure 3.10 illustrates both the periphery’s need to draw on industrial
country savings, and an important dimension in which the globalization of
capital markets remains behind the level attained under the classical gold
standard. In the last great era of globalization, the most striking character-
istic is that foreign capital had its biggest impact (relative to receiving region
GDP) in capital-scarce poor countries, although it also moved to some
richer countries. The richer countries were the settler economies where cap-
ital was attracted by abundant land, and the poor countries were places
where capital was attracted by abundant labor.65
Globalized capital markets are back, but with a diﬀerence: Capital trans-
actions seem to be mostly a rich-rich aﬀair, a process of “diversiﬁcation ﬁ-
nance” rather than “development ﬁnance.” The high-impact creditor-
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65. On the broad distribution of foreign capital then, see Twomey (2000).debtor country pairs involved are more rich-rich than rich-poor, and today’s
foreign investment in the poorest developing countries lags far behind the
levels attained at the start of the last century. In other words, we see again
the paradox noted by Lucas (1990), of capital failing to ﬂow to capital-poor
countries, places where we would presume the marginal product of capital
to be very high. The ﬁgure may also understate the failure in some ways: A
century ago, world income and productivity levels were far less divergent
than they are today, so it is all the more remarkable that so much capital was
directed to countries at or below the 20 percent and 40 percent income lev-
els (relative to the United States). Today, a much larger fraction of the
world’s output and population is located in such low-productivity regions,
but a much smaller share of global foreign investment reaches them.66
As we have noted, capital is discouraged from entering poorer countries
by a host of factors, and some of these were less relevant a century ago. Cap-
ital controls persist in many regions. The risks of investment may be per-
ceived diﬀerently after a century of exchange risks, expropriations, and de-
faults. Domestic policies that distort prices, especially of investment goods,
may result in returns too low to attract any capital. These conditions make
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Fig. 3.10 Did capital ﬂow to poor countries? 1913 versus 1997
Sources: The 1913 stock data are from Woodruﬀ (1967) and Royal Institute of International
Aﬀairs (1937); incomes are from Maddison (1995). The 1997 data are from Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2001), based on the stocks of inward direct investment and portfolio equity liabili-
ties.
66. See Clemens and Williamson (2000) for a detailed analysis of the determinants of British
capital export before 1914.a diﬃcult situation much worse. Poorer countries must draw on foreign cap-
ital to a greater extent than they do at present if they are to achieve an ac-
ceptable growth in living standards. This is a fundamental reason that re-
form and liberalization in the developing world, despite the setbacks of the
late 1990s, are likely to continue, albeit hopefully with due regard to the
painful lessons learned in the recent past.
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Comment Richard Portes
The key assertion of this paper is that the extent of globalization or inte-
gration of capital markets since the second half of the nineteenth century
has followed a clear pattern: a remarkable rise of capital market globaliza-
tion from (say) 1860 to 1914, then a sharp fall in World War I, followed by
a trough lasting over ﬁfty years, then a strong new upsurge to the present
day. The paper oﬀers a hypothesis to explain this pattern: the “trilemma”
and national policy responses to it. A subsidiary theme is the shift from cap-
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Centre for Economic Policy Research, and a research associate of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.ital ﬂows as development ﬁnance in the ﬁrst period of globalization to cap-
ital ﬂows as portfolio diversiﬁcation across industrial countries in the sec-
ond globalization era.
There is no attempt to test the trilemma hypothesis, even to confront it
with alternatives. The main eﬀort is to assemble wide-ranging evidence that
the pattern itself was very general and observable in both quantities (cross-
border capital ﬂows) and prices (interest rates, equity returns).
There are alternative drivers of capital mobility that may suggest at least
some qualiﬁcations to the trilemma hypothesis. It is not clear whether some
are consistent with the historically observed oscillation that is documented
here, nor whether they are truly exogenous, as the trilemma-based forces
could claim to be.
Consider ﬁrst information and communications technology (ICT).
Many regard that as the primary force behind the global integration of cap-
ital markets in the past two decades. One could say this recent ICT revolu-
tion has only one parallel historically, the invention of the telegraph and
then the telephone pre-1914—with no such impetus in the interwar period,
but on the other hand, no breakdown of the technology either. So that
might get us somewhere in explaining the two waves of globalization, but it
does not have anything to say about the interwar trough. The same could be
said of ﬁnancial market technology itself—there was a remarkable devel-
opment of ﬁnancial instruments in the ﬁrst wave of globalization, and again
in the past two decades, but of course no “technological regress” that could
be responsible for the interwar period.
The enforcement of international contracts is essential for ﬁnancial inte-
gration. Pre-1914, this was ensured by imperial structures and gunboat
diplomacy. They oﬀered a political and legal framework suﬃcient to sup-
port development ﬁnance from rich to poor countries and the accumulation
of large net foreign asset positions in unreliable environments. That frame-
work disintegrated in the First World War, and only from the late 1960s on-
ward did we get adequate substitutes: the Paris Club, the London Club,
IMF conditionality, and overall U.S. geopolitical hegemony that often ex-
erted pressure on debtors to meet their contractual obligations.
International ﬁnancial instability—in particular, volatility and wide
swings in exchange rates—is a deterrent to ﬁnancial integration. Indeed,
many would say that the ﬁrst era of globalization was underpinned by the
gold standard and British hegemony. Yet although the dollar peg, gold ex-
change standard established at Bretton Woods was instrumental in main-
taining monetary discipline and low inﬂation, and American hegemony re-
placed the British role, the period 1945–70 nevertheless did not see a major
advance in international ﬁnancial integration. Financial globalization took
oﬀ again after the Bretton Woods exchange rate mechanism broke down.
And in view of the crises of 1982, 1995, 1997, and 1998, it is hard to see the
IMF as the guarantor of stability. This may help, however, to explain why
184 Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylorthe major cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows have been between advanced coun-
tries rather than between them and the emerging market countries.
We might regard the globalization of production and of ﬁnancial institu-
tions as a partly exogenous driver of cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows. The im-
perialist system played this role pre-1914, and in recent decades it has been
the large multinational ﬁrms that invest abroad and develop extensive out-
sourcing that also requires ﬁnancial support. There were “global” invest-
ment banks such as Rothschilds and Barings pre-1914. They played a sig-
niﬁcant role in the sovereign lending boom of the 1920s, too, but only in the
past decade or two have we seen real ﬁnancial power accrue to Goldman
Sachs and the other “bulge-bracket” banks. Again, there is some relation to
the historically observed pattern of ﬁnancial globalization, but perhaps not
a dominant explanation.
A ﬁnal hypothesis presents itself: that current accounts—or savings-
investment imbalances—are the primary drivers of capital accounts. The
interwar trough for ﬁnancial globalization corresponds to a period in which
current account surpluses and deﬁcits were severely constrained by major
disturbances to international trade.
We see, therefore, that there is a wide variety of alternatives to the au-
thors’ fundamental hypothesis. The observed pattern could have been
driven by exogenous common shocks rather than common national policy
responses to the trilemma. In that case, the appropriate structural break
came in 1930, rather than in World War I, and the trough is also not as long-
lasting—say, until the late 1950s. There is evidence that international capi-
tal markets did reopen substantially in the 1920s, with a buildup of sover-
eign debt that came crashing down in the defaults of 1931–33. Again,
restrictions on capital movements started to break down immediately after
the restoration of current account convertibility at the end of the 1950s, and
it was the growing capital ﬂows of the 1960s that led to the breakdown of
the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime.
None of this in any way diminishes the tremendous achievement of the
authors in developing the empirical record of ﬁnancial globalization. There
are many new and important stylized facts that they establish in this paper.
The wealth of data, analysis, and interpretations gives a discussant ample
opportunity to ﬁnd interesting questions, and I shall oﬀer only a short list
of those that intrigued me.
First, the asset stock data of table 3.2 show that net holdings were close
to gross holdings pre-1914, whereas net are now much lower than gross. The
authors interpret this as a shift from development ﬁnance to portfolio di-
versiﬁcation, and overall I ﬁnd this convincing and illuminating. But we
know that this is not so true of foreign direct investment or bank lending as
it is of portfolio ﬂows. Moreover, home bias is still very strong—is that con-
sistent with the story? There are also some quite substantial discrepancies
between total assets and total liabilities (e.g., 1960, where they diﬀer by a
Globalization and Capital Markets 185factor of 3). And it would be good to get the authors’ views on why the U.K.
share of total assets stayed so stable (indeed, so high) from 1960 to 1990,
while the U.S. share fell by three-ﬁfths to a level only slightly above that of
Great Britain.
The discussion in the text now resolves two puzzles that appear from the
covered interest parity data (see ﬁg. 3.4): the apparently systematic positive
interest rate gap in favor of New York pre-1914, and the surprisingly large
size of the pre-1914 diﬀerentials. In fact, they conclude, there was an ex-
traordinarily high degree of integration among the core money markets
pre-1914, and I ﬁnd this convincing.
I am less convinced by the results of tables 3.4 and 3.5 on real interest par-
ity. For example, in table 3.4, with their preferred ﬁlter (linear detrend), the
Great Britain “band of inaction” widens monotonically from 1890 to 1974.
All bands but that of France are much wider post-1973 than in the interwar
period. Can we really believe that transaction frictions were greater? Why
should the bands be explained entirely by frictions in goods trade—do cap-
ital market frictions not also impair the ability to arbitrage in a way that hin-
ders real exchange rate convergence? I therefore ﬁnd it hard to give great
weight to table 3.5.
Interesting questions arise from the discussion of equity and bond re-
turns. Gross equity portfolio ﬂows did not become important until the late
1980s and are still less than cross-border bond ﬂows. I would therefore not
expect convincing evidence of “coherence of the returns in G7 equity mar-
kets” over a long historical period, nor of the U-shape hypothesis. And no
matter how long I look at ﬁgure 3.5 and read the corresponding passage in
the text, I do not in fact see it. The rationale given by ﬁgure 3.6 (an exten-
sion of the analysis in Eichengreen and Sachs 1985) is also not convincing:
If one removes one or at most two outliers, the upward-sloping line in the
right-hand panel becomes vertical. For bonds, again, the U-shape claimed
by the authors in ﬁgure 3.7 does not seem obvious to me.
I conclude with a few additional problems for the trilemma story. First,
the authors suggest that World War I brought political pressures for de-
mand management, hence for independent national monetary policies,
hence for restrictions on capital ﬂows—this was the common national pol-
icy response conditioned by the trilemma. But in fact, capital mobility rose
substantially in the 1920s, with the boom in sovereign lending. Second, they
say that it was a common national policy choice (again, a response to the
trilemma) to move away from the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime. I
can accept this as a characterization of the half-hearted, ultimately unsuc-
cessful attempts to put the system back together again in 1973–76. But I
agree with the authors that it is not an explanation for the breakdown of the
system—that, as they say, was due to rising capital mobility. Finally, how
does 1930–45 ﬁt in the trilemma scheme? Most countries went oﬀ gold to
ﬂoat their exchange rates, but at the same time capital controls multiplied.
186 Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. TaylorThe problem was in fact the debt defaults of 1931–33, then the approach of
war.
All this makes me eager to read the authors’ forthcoming book, which
will expand on these and other issues in the historical development of cap-
ital markets.
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